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 It is the argument of this dissertation that states become tax havens as a conscious 
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because some lack the sovereignty of the traditional Westphalian state – do not have the 
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strategies, but they do have the ability to write and implement laws that create a virtual 
resource: banking secrecy. These jurisdictions are to carry out this strategy because they tend 
to be well-governed, stable, and relatively wealthy, making them attractive partners for the 
international banking, law, and accounting firms that drive offshore finance, and then for 
their customers – both individual and corporate – as well. The qualities tax havens possess 
also enable them to calculate that the benefits they reap from pursuing this strategy outweigh 
any penalties assessed by anti-tax haven international collective action activities, such as the 
naming and shaming campaigns of 2000.  
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Chapter One  
Cuba, The Bahamas, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands, and the Paths They Took 
The Bay Street Boys had had a good run, but it was coming to an end. The ruling 
elite of  the Bahamas, so nicknamed because the men met at a club in Nassau on Bay Street, 
had taken what was a relatively quiet, if  willing, outwardly focused economy with a modest 
amount of  activity in the 1930s and turned it into a major hub of  banking and gambling 
activity by the early 1960s. The Boys did not accomplish this feat all by themselves – they 
had help from two people: Marshall Langer and Meyer Lansky (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey, 
1991; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).  
Langer was an American tax attorney who started practicing in 1951 and consulted 
with the government of  the Bahamas in rewriting its tax laws to encourage an increase in 
investment from outside the islands. The Bahamas already had a reputation in America as 
having a favorable tax environment, but Langer helped create an atmosphere of  
supercharged international development in the late 1950s (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, 
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012). 
Lansky, on the other hand, was one of  the most powerful members of  the “Outfit,” 
the Chicago organized crime syndicate once run by Al Capone. In fact, after Capone went to 
jail for tax evasion in 1931, Lansky became one of  the first Americans to start using Swiss 
banks to launder money in 1932. Lansky would fly to Switzerland with suitcases stuffed with 
cash, jewelry, bearer bonds, and anything of  value that was portable and could be 
reconverted into cash quickly. He would deposit the funds into a Swiss bank, and the bank 
would then loan an equivalent amount to one of  the companies Lansky had set up in 
America. The bank got its money back when Lansky repaid the loans which, since they were 
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from his businesses, were tax deductible. This technique – soon to become standard practice 
– was called “loaning back” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; 
Shaxson, 2012). 
The money Lansky was laundering mainly came from different forms of  gambling – 
casinos and horse racing – which had the disadvantage of  being illegal in America. Cuba, on 
the other hand, was a different story, and Lansky’s operations in Cuba in the 1950s turned 
the island into “the most decadent spot on the planet” (Robinson, 2004: 37). Lansky’s 
success in turning Cuba into a louche vacation spot for Americans was so great, in fact, that 
it led in part to the 1959 revolution that installed Fidel Castro, necessitating a new island 
paradise for Lansky to transform (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey, 1991; Palan, Murphy, & 
Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).  
Enter the Bay Street Boys. They were all too willing to partner with Lansky and 
together the Boys and Lansky created the Grand Bahamas Development Corporation 
(DEVCO), which gave Lansky and his partners a foothold on the island. Lansky also paid 
Bahamian finance minister Stafford Sands a $1.8 million bribe to help make the island’s 
government more cooperative, the result of  which was stricter laws pertaining to banks 
releasing information about their customers to anyone, including criminal investigators. 
These laws made the Bahamas an even more attractive destination for money launderers and 
tax evaders, and development on the island boomed (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey, 1991; 
Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Robinson, 2004; Shaxson, 2012). 
Until 1967. As in Cuba, popular discontent with the way the mafia and the local elites 
were despoiling the island led the Bahamians to revolt, albeit peacefully. The 1967 election 
was won by Lynden Pindling, a populist who ran on a reform platform calling for an end to 
gambling and corruption. This platform was not as threatening to what would become 
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known as the “offshore” crowd – bankers, accountants, and lawyers like Langer who make 
their living creating new tax avoidance and evasion strategies for wealthy individuals and 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) – as the fact that Pindling was black and was calling for 
end to white minority rule; an end, as it were, to the rule of  the Bay Street Boys. While the 
Bahamas remained, and would continue to remain, prosperous and relatively unaffected by 
the Pindling movement that led to independence in 1973, the smart money went elsewhere 
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Robinson, 2004; Shaxson, 2012). 
There were two choices. Two nearby islands with the British legal pedigree that 
allowed for the passage of  banking secrecy and foreign ownership laws necessary to create a 
safe haven for offshore money and its handlers: Jamaica; and Jamaica’s former dependent the 
Cayman Islands. Jamaica was more developed and in the throes of  a growing economy 
thanks to high demand for the bauxite it mined and exported, and definitely more advanced 
than the backwater the Cayman Islands was at the time. Jamaica was also politically more 
sophisticated, having declared its independence from Great Britain in 1962. More disturbing 
to the offshore community was the election the following year, which was won by William 
Alexander Bustamante and the Jamaican Labor Party. It didn’t seem to matter that the Labor 
Party was not socialist in the manner of  the English political party of  the same name; the 
Jamaicans seemed determined to control their own political and economic destiny (Brittain-
Catlin, 2005; Library of  Congress, 1989).   
As it turned out, the ruling elite of  the Caymans had no such pretensions. Granted, 
the Caymans declared itself  independent of  Jamaica in 1959 and created its own 
constitution, but chose to remain a British crown colony when given the option in 1962. 
This amount of  soveriegnty turned out exactly what the Cayman selectorate desired: 
independent enough to write their own laws and levy their own taxes, but still tied to the 
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body of  British common law such that its precedents in cases like Calcutta Jute Mills and 
Egyptian Delta1 held, allowing the Caymans to create the most inviting investment and 
banking environment in the Caribbean, if  not the world (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, 
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012). 
The effect of  the new attention on the Caymans was almost immediate. The island 
had never had taxes of  any consequence on its citizens, raising revenue for the government 
through import duties, and the sale of  postage stamps and banking licenses, as well as from 
the fees companies pay to incorporate there. Their one and only bank – a Barclay’s – had 
opened in 1953. The bank sat on the one paved road in George Town, the capital city of  
Grand Cayman, the largest island. It was likely that the bank’s customers – who would not be 
able to call ahead because the island had no phone system – would encounter cattle 
wandering the streets on their way to patronize the bank. This was life in the Caymans until 
1966, when bankers like the newly arrived Jean Doucet helped convince the legislature to 
pass a series of  new laws, including the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law, the 
Trusts Law, the Exchange Control Regulations Law. These laws were created mostly from 
ideas the bankers themselves suggested in committee meetings chaired by the Cayman 
Islands Financial Secretary and passed with minimal debate or opposition by the legislature 
after passing through the Private Sector Consultative Committee, a trade association made 
up Caymanian financial professionals who had to give any financially-oriented legislation its 
imprimatur before it was voted on. These laws made it much easier to create trusts like the 
Star Trust, which allows the owner of  the trust to be protected in such a way that enables 
1 Calcutta Jute Mills, Ltd. V. Nicholson (Surveyor of Taxes) in 1876 found that, for tax purposes, a 
company’s residence is wherever its “central management and control” is located (Calcutta Jute Mills Ltd. 
v. Nicholson (Surveyor of Taxes), 1876). Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Company, Ltd. V. Todd in 
1929 found that companies founded by British citizens but headquartered outside the UK were not liable 
for British tax (Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Company, Ltd. v. Todd, 1929). 
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the owner to make investment decisions without having to worry about what impact those 
decisions will have on the beneficiaries of  the trusts. Or to open banks like the Sterling 
Bank, which Doucet opened in 1966 as one of  the first private banks on the islands 
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012). 
The offshore money began to pour in and by 1967 the Caymans was a state-of-the-
art investment hub, with connections to the international telephone network and a new 
airport built specifically to handle jet traffic. Corporate lawyers like Bill Walker, who had 
moved from Guyana in 1963, had more business than they could handle. By the end of  the 
1960s, when the Caymans abolished their bilateral tax treaties with the United States in order 
to give their banking customers complete and total confidentiality from American law 
enforcement and tax authorities, they were on their way to becoming one of  the world’s 
largest banking and incorporation centers (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & 
Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).  
Her Majesty’s Government was initially positive about the Cayman Islands’ success. 
The British Colonial Reports acted as booster, reinforcing the initial opinion of  the Bank of  
England and the British Overseas Development Ministry that any economic growth is good 
and that a colony that develops its own economic base is a colony that will no longer have to 
beg for British aid, thereby reducing costs to the British government. Official opinion within 
the British government was hardly united, and began to splinter further as the Caymans 
gradually abandoned all pretense about what they were doing, going so far as to establish a 
government Tax Haven Committee in 1970 to “expand and promote tax haven activities on 
the island” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005: 152). 
It did not take long, however, for even the Caymans’ hardiest supporters in British 
government to recognize what the islands had become. As the Bank of  England noted on 
5
April 11, 1969, “the smaller, less sophisticated and remote islands are receiving almost 
constant attention and blandishments from expatriate operators who aspire to turn them 
into their own private empires. The administrations in these places find it difficult to 
understand what is involved and resist tempting offers” (Shaxson, 2012: 92). Condescending 
language aside, the Bank correctly analyzed the increased attention the Caymans were 
receiving from the outside world, both licit and illicit. By the early 1970s, every major 
American bank had a branch in the Caymans to compete for the rapidly growing deposit 
business there, some of  the money literally being flown in on Lear jets in suitcases carrying 
millions of  dollars in cash. Not only did the banks and the Caymanian officials not worry 
about where the money came from, but the island’s police force would happily provide an 
escort from the airport to the bank for customers carrying large amounts of  cash (Brittain-
Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).  
Where the Bank was wrong was in its interpretation of  the Caymanian officials being 
victimized by their more-worldly peers in the offshore business. From the beginning in the 
mid-1960s, the intention of  the Caymanian officials was to create a very specific niche, 
hosting tax law and accounting experts from the offshore world to help them create laws 
that would allow them to compete with the likes of  Liechtenstein and Switzerland. There 
was a conscious effort that led to the legislative jewel in the crown: The Confidential 
Relationships (Preservation) Law of  1976. This law, in response to increased pressure from 
American banking and law enforcement authorities, made it a crime punishable by prison to 
reveal any financial or banking client information regardless of  who made the request. In 
fact, the law also criminalized the request for information by anyone other than clients. This 
was the culmination of  a ten-year collaborative effort by the Cayman government and 
offshore interests to, as a 1973 British Foreign Office confidential memorandum correctly 
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concluded, “set up as a tax haven” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 
2010; Shaxson, 2012: 91). 
The Puzzle, the Literatures, and the Contribution 
Why do states become tax havens? Is the Cayman experience typical? Is this 
combination of  political will and outside influence the way that states become tax havens? If  
the potential benefits are so great, why do other states like Cuba or Jamaica not also become 
tax havens? These are the primary questions I will attempt to answer in this dissertation. Tax 
havens exist in the international system despite nearly universal official disapprobation. 
States recognized as tax havens are classified as, if  not exactly pariahs, then not exactly 
members of  the community of  nations in good standing, either. Phrases in common 
parlance like “Swiss bank account” have almost exclusively negative connotations; indeed, 
one popular rumor is that millions in gold stolen by the Nazis during World War II is still 
hidden in Swiss banks, with the complicity of  amoral Swiss bankers (Guex, 2000). Since the 
late 1990s, in fact, there have been concerted international efforts to deter what the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development called “harmful tax 
competition” (OECD, 1998), an effort that evolved to include anti-money laundering and 
terrorism financing efforts. It became common knowledge that tax evaders, criminals, and 
even Osama bin Laden and other terrorists were using tax havens (Baker, 2005; Naylor, 
2004). 
The prevalence of  these efforts raises another question: how is it that tax havens 
continue to operate? While every tax haven complies, in one form or another, with the 
requests of  the international organizations tasked with shutting them down, very few tax 
havens have ceased operations in the face of  such concerted effort. And these states are 
hardly regional powers, much less hegemons; most are small – 4 million people or fewer – 
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and, in security terms, weak. A good portion of  tax havens don’t even provide for their own 
defense, instead relying on timeworn colonial relationships for domestic security. Yet most 
of  them have taken a stand against the most powerful states in the world – both in economic 
and military terms – and have persevered, continuing to attract hundreds of  billions of  
dollars each year in foreign direct investment. How have the Seychelles, for example, a state 
independent only since 1976 and with a population of  around 96,000, able to withstand the 
collective efforts of  the US, the EU, and Japan and continue to thrive economically? Just as 
important, how did states like the Seychelles become tax havens in the first place? What is it 
about these srates that enabled them to make the relatively sophisticated moves required to 
achieve tax haven status, and then to remain tax havens in the face of  almost universal 
disapprobation?  
This dissertation will attempt to answer these questions by locating its argument in a 
nexus of  three literatures: tax havens; small states; and regimes. The tax haven and small 
states literatures will be used to take previous operational definitions of  tax havens and use 
them to differentiate a distinct group of  jurisdictions that shares characteristics of, but is 
different from, non-tax haven small states. Tax haven literature, exemplified by the work of  
Christensen (2011, 2012), Dharmapala & Hines (2009), Eden & Kudrle (2005), and Palan, 
Murphy, & Chavagneux (2010), among others, is useful for pinning down what a tax haven 
is, what distinguishes it from other states, as well as defining its place in the international 
system. There has not yet, however, been a large-scale systematic examination of  the process 
by which states become tax havens. Examinations exist, but they tend to be case studies, or 
focused on one particular region, or both. This dissertation will attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature by taking the existing work and broadening its scope, allowing us to conceive of  
tax havens as rational actors in an anarchic international system, in effect applying principles 
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of  realism and macroeconomics to better understand the transformation these states 
undergo and the forces that impel them. 
In order to accomplish this chracterization, however, it is important to understand 
how tax havens exist as small states, what differentiates small states from larger ones, how 
this differentiation affects tax haven formation, and what distinguishes tax havens as a 
separate group from non-tax haven small states. As the dissertation’s analysis will discuss in 
greater depth, tax havens are states with populations of  fewer than four million people in all 
but a handful of  cases. In addition, a significant number of  tax havens are located on islands. 
It is therefore critical to understand the small states literature, in particular the Small Island 
Economy (SIE) work of  Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, & Read (1998), Cobb (1998, 2001), 
Hampton (1996), and Vlcek (2008, 2009), among others. These works delve into the role 
small states play in the global economy, and why small state governance enables that role. 
This literature, combined with classics of  political development such as Acemoglu & 
Robinson (2006), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow (2004), Jackson (1990), 
and Lipset (1959), provide a solid theoretical foundation understanding the nature of  tax 
havens both as small states and as a sui generis phenomenon. In addition, one surprising 
development of  the research for this dissertation is the extent to which tax havens and small 
states – especially states with populations of  one million or fewer – overlap, suggesting that 
perhaps what the literature observes as small state political behavior might actually be tax 
haven behavior.  
Finally, in order to understand why states become tax havens in the face of  
international anti-tax haven regimes formed by the world’s strongest states, it is critical to 
understand the nature of  international regimes themselves, and why states comply with 
them. This understanding must of  necessity start with the seminal 1982 issue of  International 
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Organizations that included the landmark work of  Keohane (1982), Krasner (1982), and 
Puchala & Hopkins (1982), and progress to (Abbott & Snidal (1998) and Nadelmann (1990), 
among others, to understand why states create international regimes, especially international 
prohibition regimes, and why states would relinquish sovereignty to join one and act 
collectively.  
This is the first half  of  regime theory that needs to be understood in order to solve 
the tax haven puzzle. The second half  is why target states would comply with regime edicts, 
especially punitive ones, what the consequences of  non-compliance are, and how effective 
international regimes are at accomplishing their goals. This literature involves studying the 
conquences of  compliance in general as well as naming and shaming campaigns and includes 
Barry, Clay, & Flynn (2013), Chayes & Chayes (1993), and Dai (2005), while literature 
specifically addressing tax haven compliance includes Blanton & Blanton (2012), Kudrle 
(2009), and Simmons (2000). The final piece in understanding compliance is reputation 
theory, of  which Tomz (2007) is the exemplar.  
The argument for this dissertation has three basic components based on three 
literatures: what about states compels them to become tax havens; what influence their being 
small, sometimes isolated, states has on this process; and the relationship between these 
states and the international regime created to dissuade them from tax haven behavior. This 
argument builds on the contributions made by the tax haven, small states, and regime 
literatures by taking a global systemic approach and integrating it with an understanding of  
individual state behavior and the role of  elites in both states and regime formation and 
implementation. This dissertation represents the first attempt at a study of  this combination 
of  theoretical and quantitative rigor and interdisciplinary flexibility, a combination necessary 
to answer questions concerning the process by which tax havens form, thrive, and continue 
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to operate in an international political and economic system despite their significant 
deleterious impact on that system and the states that form the regimes to eliminate them. 
What is a Tax Haven? 
Before answering these questions, however, it is important to define what the term 
“tax haven” means, and to discuss its basic characteristics and the literature surrounding that 
definition. 
Sovereignty: from Westphalia to Vanuatu 
Most definitions of  the term “tax haven” involve four separate concepts: tax havens 
are 1) jurisdictions that offer customers 2) low or no taxes, 3) transactional secrecy, and 4) 
ease of  registration and relatively low corporate activity requirements (Addison, 2009; 
Ambrosanio & Beard, 1985-1986; Caroppo, 2005; Christensen, 2011; Cobham, Jansky, & 
Meinzer, 2015; Dharmapala, 2008; Gregory, 2012; Irish, 1982; Murphy, 2017; OECD, 1998; 
Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010, among others). It is instructive that, when describing 
tax havens, the legal term “jurisdiction” rather than “state” is used in both academic and 
non-academic texts. This distinction is a critical one to draw: going back in Western law to 
the Treaty of  Westphalia in 1648, the state is an independent unit that enjoys both legal and 
actual self-determination (Patrick, 2011: 22-3).  
Strictly speaking, almost half  of  all tax havens do not fit this definition: they are not 
states. Several of  the states generally considered to be tax havens are under the protection of  
a full-fledged state, either as a colony, dependency, or protectorate. Of  the 51 jurisdictions 
classified as “tax havens” for the purposes of  this study, 17 are not fully independent states, 
or 33%. For the purposes of  their customers, however, these jurisdictions don’t need to be 
fully sovereign; they just need to be sovereign enough to provide the two dimensions of  
soverieignty necessary to create an effective tax haven: 1) geographic; and 2) legal.  
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The demand for geographic separation by tax haven customers is made plain in the 
common usage another term used to describe tax havens: “Offshore Financial Centers 
(OFCs)” (Cobb, 1998; Hampton & Levi, 1999; Hudson, 2000). OFCs are generally referred 
to as “offshore” for short, as is the whole industry and the professionals employed therein. 
The term reflects a desire by its customers to withdraw, to hide their funds and their 
activities away from prying eyes. Regulators make the onshore/offshore distinction in the 
following way: the state where the customer makes her home or has her primary citizenship 
is “onshore;” the state where the customer transacts her business or has accounts or 
corporations established for the purpose of  obscuring their activities is “offshore.” This 
nomenclature holds regardless of  whether the OFC in question is an island or not: 
Switzerland, Costa Rica, and Latvia are all OFCs, but they are also landlocked. 
The above states may not be islands in the geographical sense of  the term 
“offshore,” but they are in the second, or legislative sense. The laws that characterize a state 
as an OFC/tax haven2 provide its customers with a legislative wall of  secrecy behind which 
they can hide their financial transactions. The key to understanding a tax haven’s importance 
is that it is a physical entity that has sovereignty, and it uses that sovereignty to create laws 
and regulations for the benefit of  its financial services customers who generally live 
elsewhere. These laws include protecting bank employees who refuse to disclose information 
about their customers, as well as an institutionalized lack of  curiosity about those customers’ 
identities and the purposes of  the transactions undertaken. The goal of  offshoring is to 
create both physical and legal space between financial activities and the government agencies 
charged with regulating and taxing those activities (Christensen, 2011: 183; Cobb, 1998: 8; 
Hampton & Levi, 1999: 646; Hudson, 2000: 270; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 21).  
2 For simplicity’s sake, I will use the term “tax haven” for the rest of the dissertation. 
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One condition both necessary and sufficient to define a tax haven is that the 
jurisdiction offer a tax regime that includes zero or very low rates of  taxation. These regimes 
are set up primarily to benefit foreign investors, and some tax havens in the past have 
practiced “ring fencing,” or levying zero or very low tax rates to individuals or companies 
based in another conducting financial transactions while based in another jurisdiction, while 
levying higher tax rates on its own citizens. The idea is to create something of  value to 
attract foreign capital where there previously had been none or very little. That “something” 
in the case of  tax havens is the opportunity to conduct business or to open a bank account 
without having to pay the taxes such activities would attract in their home countries. There 
are other benefits a jurisdiction can provide to foreign individuals and corporations without 
offering zero or very low tax rates – secrecy and ease of  incorporation (more below) – but 
when the literature or the outside experts refer to “tax havens,” the jurisdictions to which 
they refer almost always offer at least preferential tax regimes to foreign investors. Finally, a 
tax haven may create an income tax regime that gives breaks to a specific type of  industry, 
such as insurance or banking (Ambrosanio & Caroppo, 2005: 686; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 
2004: 1; Dharmapala, 2008: 662; Gregory, 2012: 863; Irish, 1982: 453-4; Johannsen, 2010: 
254; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 30-1). 
The second condition that defines a jurisdiction as a tax haven is its use of  secrecy to 
attract foreign investors and other customers, and to protect them once they become 
customers. Secrecy is so important as a concept to tax havens that another term of  art used 
to describe tax havens is “secrecy jurisdictions,” a term that emphasizes the importance of  
the tax haven as a legal construct, that is, as a set of  laws, regulations, and legal procedures 
set up explicitly to benefit foreign investors and customers. The concept of  “secrecy” with 
regards to tax havens has two dimensions: a) confidentiality; and b) lack of  cooperation. Tax 
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havens create laws that permit financial institutions to keep information regarding their 
account holders and their transactions completely confidential, to the extent of, in the case 
of  The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law of  1976 discussed above, making it a 
criminal offense to both request – and to reveal – information about an account holder in a 
Cayman Islands bank. The more common, less aggressive version of  this type of  secrecy is 
for financial institutions on tax havens to require only the bare minimum of  information 
regarding their account holders, and requiring an official request from a law enforcement 
agency from the account holder’s home country to divulge that information (Ambrosanio & 
Caroppo, 2005: 686; Cobham, Jansky, & Meinzer, 2015: 2-9; Irish, 1982: 453-4; OECD, 1998: 
23; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 9).  
For example, if  an American drug dealer deposited $1 million in a bank account on 
the Cook Islands, the only way the bankers would divulge that information is if  the 
American Drug Enforcement Agency was able to officially request that release based on 
information conclusively demonstrating that the $1 million was the proceeds of  a specific 
crime. Note that it is not sufficient for, say, the Internal Revenue Service to request the drug 
dealer’s account information on the grounds that they avoided paying taxes in the United 
States, as they haven’t broken any tax evasion laws in the Cook Islands. This behavior by tax 
haven authorities is also an example of  the second dimension of  banking secrecy: a general 
lack of  cooperation with non-tax haven countries in enforcing their laws or assisting them in 
any significant way. This non-cooperation has its legal basis in British common law 
precedent established by Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of  England, [1924] 1 
K.B. 461 (1923), which allows financial institutions to keep account holder information 
confidential unless they are required to divulge it by a law enforcement agency under 
extraordinary circumstances. Most tax havens are or were British Crown Colonies, and as a 
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result British common law applies to them, and British common law has several precedents, 
including Tournier, that allow tax havens to establish secrecy laws allowing them to function 
as secrecy jurisdictions.  
In addition, this lack of  cooperation extends to international law as well, as another 
characteristic of  tax havens is an absence of  participation in bilateral income tax treaties 
(DTTs)3, or treaties signed between two countries agreeing not to tax any income repatriated 
from one signatory country to the other. For example, America has a DTT with Canada, 
which means that American residents who make money off  a transaction in Canada and are 
taxed on that income by Canadian authorities will not be taxed again on that same 
transaction when the money returns to America. Tax havens refuse to sign DTTs, and in 
general will refuse to cooperate with national or international authorities unless they are 
forced (Ambrosanio & Caroppo, 2005: 686; Beard, 1985-1986: 523 fn 13; Cobham, Jansky, & 
Meinzer, 2015: 2-9; Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 114; Irish, 1982: 453-4; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan, 
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 9). 
The third condition that defines a jurisdiction as a tax haven is a legal and regulatory 
structure that permits the existence of  – or actively encourages – business or financial 
operations within their physical borders that enable individuals or firms to conduct the bulk 
of  their business offshore. These regulations can manifest themselves as: an absence of  
exchange control restrictions, making it possible for non-residents to trade in resident 
currency, or transfer their holdings from one currency to another; or an absence of  a 
requirement that any corporate activities be substantial, i.e. anything other than the recording 
of  transfers of  goods or services on paper. The regulations – or their absence – indicate that 
the jurisdiction is interested primarily attracting customers interested in tax avoidance or 
3 DTT stands for “Double Taxation Treaty.”  
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evasion rather conducting actual business. Another term for these types of  tax havens are 
“booking centers,” because the transactions taking place elsewhere are merely recorded or 
“booked” as occurring within the subsidiary located in the tax haven.  Another way tax 
havens use regulations to create competitive advantages for themselves is by making it 
relatively easy or inexpensive for customers to form corporations or register subsidiaries, 
allowing customers to maintain operations in their resident jurisdictions while still recording 
transactions in the tax haven. The flexibility this ease of  incorporation affords allows tax 
havens to, ultimately, become entrepot centers for the rest of  the world, enabling enormous 
flows of  foreign direct investment (FDI) both into and out of  tax haven financial 
institutions (Becht, Mayer, & Wagner, 2008; Dean, 2006-2007: 926 fn 66; Gravelle, 2015: 3; 
Irish, 1982: 453-4; Maingot, 1995: 5-6; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 
2010: 21-56). 
None of  this effort on the part of  the tax havens would amount to much if  not for 
the final condition: self-promotion. Tax havens have to advertise themselves as being tax 
havens, to cultivate a global reputation as a jurisdiction in which customers have access to 
tax-free secrecy and ease of  operation. Part of  this promotion is cultivating a modern 
technology infrastructure permitting sophisticated financial transactional activity, as well as a 
workforce skilled enough and dedicated to financial service provision, but primarily the key 
distinction here is that the jurisdiction deliberately sets about creating a certain image. That 
image is one of  a laissez-faire attitude towards attracting actual investment, focusing instead 
on promoting tax avoidance, unrestricted business operation, and a devotion to protecting 
the customer’s secrecy. In effect, tax havens are easy for  Intergovernmental Organizations 
(IGOs) dedicated to their reform like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to find because they have to make their presence known (Addison, 
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2009: 706; Beard, 1985-1986: 524 fn 19; Dean, 2006-2007: 926 fn 66; Gravelle, 2015: 3; Irish, 
1982: 453-4; Maingot, 1995: 5-6; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan, 2002: 154).  
International Collective Action Against Tax Havens 
The international community has not sat idly by as more and more jurisdictions 
moved to become tax havens; there have been several large-scale organized international 
efforts to prevent tax havens from passing and implementing the laws and regulations that 
attract foreign capital, and to counteract the deleterious effects of  this attraction. These 
efforts can be comfortably classified as attempts to impose regimes of  appropriate financial 
state behavior on the global tax marketplace. A regime is a group of  principles – both 
explicit and implicit – norms, rules, and a set of  operating procedures generated from the 
understandings the participants have about appropriate, effective, and moral behavior in a 
particular issue area (Keohane, 1982: 334; Krasner, 1982: 185-6; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982: 
246). Regimes exist to solve a problem or series of  problems, not least of  which is the 
problem of  collective action in a community of  sovereign states. Explicating these problems 
and developing their solutions requires from the states involved that they: agree on the 
nature of  both the problems and the solutions; and that they commit to acting to implement 
those solutions. Both of  these actions require that a group of  elites emerge around these 
issue areas, both within the states and internationally. These are the people with the expertise 
to both understand the problem and implement the solution, and whose involvement is 
necessary for the regime to succeed (Keohane, 1982: 354; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982: 246-7). 
Another requirement of  the regime’s success is that it is legally binding to its 
participants. Since states are sovereign, they will not limit their sovereignty voluntarily, so 
they must agree to join the regime – as international law only applies to those parties who 
agree upon its application – either willingly or by force (Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 180; 
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Keohane, 1982: 330; Krasner, 1982: 189). Regime theorists agree that states will reduce their 
sovereignty in order to willingly join a regime if  it is in their own best interests – or the 
collective best interests of  their allies – to do so. Joining a regime unwillingly – having a 
regime imposed upon a sovereign state is, by contrast, not an indicator of  that state’s best 
interests, but rather of  that state’s power relative to the states demanding membership from 
it (Keohane, 1982: 330; Krasner, 1982: 191). 
Given that a regime’s purpose is to reinforce a set of  principles, i.e. “beliefs of  fact, 
causation, and rectitude,” norms, i.e. “standards of  behavior defined in terms of  rights and 
obligations,” and rules, i.e. “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” (Krasner, 
1982: 186), and that the behavior of  some of  the states subject to the regime behave in ways 
that violate these principles, norms, and rules, it stands to reason that regimes will be 
coercive in applying these principles, norms, and rules to these states in ways that do not 
benefit them. These weaker states are then faced with a choice: comply, and act in a way that 
does not benefit them as an individual state but benefits the other members of  the regime; 
or become what Eden and Kudrle (2005) refer to as a “renegade” state, not complying and 
facing potential punishment by the regime members for breaking the rules. If  we further 
take as given that these states are rational, then the reason a state does not comply with the 
regime is if  that state believes the benefits of  not complying are greater than either the 
penalties sustained for not complying or the benefits for complying.  
This logic is consistent with Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom’s (1996) finding that 
regimes succeed – that is, states comply or are effectively punished – when these behaviors 
resemble what the states would have done in their absence. That is, regimes exist to codify 
and routinize behavior states already find beneficial. Reinforcing this finding is Simmons’s 
(2000) conclusion that states are more likely to comply with a regime if  their neighbors do, 
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and that this condition has more impact on state behavior than the content of  the regime 
itself. In addition, if, as Abbott & Snidal (1998) argue, “powerful states structure such 
organizations to further their own interests but must do so in a way that induces weaker 
states to participate,” then this modified realist interpretation explains why regime 
enforcement efforts like those put in place by international organizations like the OECD: 1) 
focus on punishing tax haven states, which are weaker; and 2) aren’t effective in constraining 
tax haven state behavior. Because it serves the interests of  elites in regime participant states 
for the tax havens to continue to operate while at the same time maintaining power by 
appeasing pro-reform elements in government pushing for these regimes. 
Dai (2005) provides the theoretical bridge that connects the general theories about 
state compliance to the specific behavior of  tax havens within the global financial system. 
Dai finds that a state’s compliance with a specific regime is as much a question of  domestic 
influence as external pressure. Dai points out that individuals within a state do not benefit 
uniformly from that state’s compliance with a specific regime. Similar to the argument by 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) underpinning selectorate theory, Dai finds that domestic 
elites will use their leverage to force states to either comply or not comply with a regime 
depending on which outcome is in their best interests. This logic can also apply to the elites 
within the states in charge of  compliance enforcement: if  it is in their best interests for a 
state not to comply with a regime – even though they themselves were instrumental in the 
regime’s construction – then the state is less likely to comply either through elite pressure or 
through a sort of  regulatory sabotage, whereupon the elites build in ineffective compliance 
mechanisms to the regime (Krasner, 1982: 193; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982: 247), or simply 
change the rules to suit the “exigencies of  the moment” (Keohane, 1982: 331). Applying this 
essentially Grotian logic to tax haven behavior, the reasons why a state might not comply 
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with tax fairness or anti-money laundering regimes: either the state – or the selectorate 
within the state – has more to gain from not complying and remaining a renegade state; or 
the penalties threatened or imposed by ostensibly more powerful non-tax haven states are 
ineffective as punishments or deterrents.  
Furthermore, liberal international relations principles to the contrary, a tax haven’s 
political status as democratic is no guarantee of  compliance with regime edicts. While 
Simmons (2000: 832) states that “regimes based on clear principles of  the rule of  law are far 
more likely to comply with their commitments,” this tendency in itself  does not guarantee 
compliance  with regimes either. If  tax havens see their commitments to their selectorate or 
to other states’ elites as more important than their commitment to any abstract 
“international community” which, after all, asks only that the state cease those activities that 
comprise its economic livelihood without offering much in return, then it is all the more 
likely that they will comply with those commitments to their customers rather than to the 
regime. This tendency is more likely, according to Simmons (2000), if  the tax haven’s 
neighbors react in a similar way, as she concludes that state behavior is more likely to be 
influenced by the behavior of  other states in the region than by the edicts of  an regime. As 
we will see below, tax havens tend to cluster geographically, and this argument could be one 
explanation for that phenomenon. Another structural characteristic explored in depth below 
is the relative stability and sophistication of  tax haven governance, enabling them to pass 
laws and engage in evasive or minimally compliant behaviors that render anti-tax haven 
regimes “mostly symbolic in nature” (Addison, 2009: 704). 
Symbolism, it turns out, is a weapon that regimes frequently deploy against tax 
havens. Specifically, international organizations like the OECD have resorted to “naming and 
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shaming” tactics like the creation of  blacklists4 in part to force weak states to behave in a 
manner the strong states would prefer, while succeeding at creating norms of  international 
financial behavior (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8). Naming and shaming campaigns are created in 
the absence of  the regime participants’ inability or unwillingness to take more direct action 
against the subjects of  the campaign. One way these campaigns work is by negatively 
affecting a state’s reputation, thereby constraining its future behavior such that states are 
forced into compliance (Tomz, 2007). For example, the OECD has used a blacklisting 
campaign to attempt to get tax havens to raise corporate income tax rates and loosen secrecy 
laws. As we will see below, however, states can comply with blacklisting campaigns merely by 
agreeing to adhere to the strictures the regime is attempting to impose.  
This shadow compliance has three different purposes: 1) it allows the blacklisted 
state to repair its reputation without actually making any significant changes; 2) it allows the 
transnational elites who have created the regime to be seen to be acting affirmatively; and 3) 
it creates and transmits the norms that define unacceptable state behavior. In the OECD 
case, for example, tax haven states can agree to comply with OECD dictates while not 
changing their behavior to get their names removed from the blacklist, but the OECD is at 
least able to transmit the message to the wider international community that tax competition 
is harmful and unacceptable. Finally, a naming and shaming campaign can have long-term 
effects on the states that appear on the blacklist, even briefly: if  they acquire the global 
reputation as a renegade or pariah state, this will negatively affect the way they are treated by 
other individual states and other regimes, and could end costing them more than the initial 
action leading to blacklist was worth. Symbolic actions in this case can have real 
4 Ironically, these blacklists play a role in research on tax havens, as they act as useful indicators of 
which countries have built up a significant enough reputation and clientele to warrant censure. 
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consequences (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8; Keohane, 1982: 354; Krasner, 1982: 193; Puchala & 
Hopkins, 1982: 247).   
Benefits vs. Costs of  Being a Tax Haven 
The question for jurisdictions that considered tax haven status then is: if  they run 
the risk of  becoming pariah states, why become a tax haven? Are the benefits of  
weaponizing sovereignty and becoming a tax haven worth the risks associated with stepping 
outside the bounds of  acceptable state behavior in the eyes of  the international community? 
Benefit: Increased FDI5 Inflow 
According to James Henry (2016), senior advisor at the Tax Justice Institute, tax 
havens currently house at least $24 trillion in private wealth, most of  this booked through 
offshore branches of  global banks such as UBS, Barclays, and Bank of  America, making the 
money instantly accessible to its holders but unaccountable to government tax authorities, 
resulting in what Zucman (2015) conservatively estimates as $200 billion in lost tax revenue. 
According to World Bank data, in 2015 FDI inflows to the jurisdictions identified as tax 
havens by the author totalled nearly $190 billion, or an average of  $5.8 billion per year per 
tax haven with populations of  four million or fewer. By contrast, non-tax haven countries 
with populations of  four million or fewer averaged $549 million the same year. When the 
population cutoff  is 1.5 million, the difference is even starker: tax havens average an FDI of  
$4.3 billion, while non-tax havens drop to $276 million. When the population cutoff  drops 
to 1 million, tax havens average an FDI of  $4.2 billion, while non-tax havens drop to $268 
million. As a first cut analysis, tax haven jurisdictions appear to generate inbound FDI an 
order of  magnitude greater than non-tax haven jurisdictions of  similar size (see Table 1.1). 
5 FDI = Foreign Direct Investment, or the amount of money flowing from an individual or business 
in one country into the business interests in another. This transaction usually takes the forms of incorporating a 
new business or buying a controlling interest in an existing one. 
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This finding is consistent with Blanton & Blanton’s (2012) that FDI is attracted to well-
governed states. 
Table 1.1: Average FDI inflow per jurisdiction in 2015, by population range and tax haven 
status 
Population  Tax Haven Non-Tax Haven 
0-4 million $5.8 billion (n = 41) $549 million (n = 61) 
0-1.5 million $4.3 billion (n = 35) $276 million (n = 36) 
0-1 million $4.2 billion (n = 33) $268 million (n = 30) 
Data Source: United Nations (UN) Population Division; International Monetary Fund 
Balance of  Payments Database 
NOTE: Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Malaysia are excluded from these tax haven samples 
because their populations exceed 4 million. 
 
An additional benefit to attracting FDI inflows with what are essentially financial 
services is that startup costs and additional capital outlays to transform a jurisdiction into a 
tax haven are much lower than other economic development strategies like boosting natural 
resource extraction or industrializing. Because these states are typically small, with small 
populations, their public expenditures tend to be relatively low at the outset,6 and instituting 
a low-tax regime has limited impact on public policy. Similar to the point made above 
concerning regime theory, one reason small states adopt a low-tax regime is that it doesn’t 
require a radical change in daily life. In addition, a low-tax regime makes the tax haven 
economic development strategy appealing to the state’s selectorate as their taxes either stay 
low or get lower, ensuring that their support for the government implementing the strategy 
will continue, increasing the state’s political stability. Furthermore, the tax haven economic 
6 Especially if, as in the case of the Cayman Islands, the population tends towards being culturally 
conservative and politically hostile to the idea of social welfare spending (Brittain-Catlin, 2005). 
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development strategy is a relatively inexpensive one, especially if  the jurisdiction is already 
positioning itself  as a tourist destination, which many tax havens do. In addition to passing 
the necessary laws, the jurisdiction needs an airport that can handle both private and 
commercial air traffic, a modern telecommunications grid including high-speed Internet 
capability, and relatively skilled workforce in law, accounting, and banking as well as clerical 
work. Unlike the other economic development strategies available to small islands, becoming 
a tax haven does not require extensive public expenditures for mining equipment, or the 
direct and associated costs of  heavy industry. Despite its myriad faults, the tax haven 
economic development strategy can appear to be one with high returns for low expenditures 
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2004; Persaud, 2001; 
Vlcek, 2008).  
The associated income benefits are high enough that tax havens are more likely to 
become wealthy states than non-tax haven states. Of  the ten states with the highest gross 
domestic product  (GDP) per capita (PPP) in 2016, five – Luxembourg, Macao, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Hong Kong – are tax havens. The number of  tax havens in the 2016 top 10 
drops slightly to four - Luxembourg, Macao, Singapore, and Malta – when a population cap 
of  four million is introduced, but rises to six when the cap is both 1.5 million and one 
million, with the tax havens being Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Cyprus, Trinidad & Tobago, 
and the Seychelles. The bulk of  the other states on the top 10 list are classfied by the IMF as 
“resource dependent,” including petrostates Qatar, the UAE, Norway, and Equitorial Guinea 
and gas state Brunei (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012). In 
fact, the only states in the top 10 that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are 
24
Ireland,7 Slovenia, New Zealand, and Iceland. Of  the last three, Slovenia and New Zealand 
have balanced industrial economies, while Iceland depends to an extent on its fishing 
industry – as do most small islands (see Table 1.2).   
Table 1.2: Top 10 States 2016 GDP Per Capita, (PPP) By Population Range (* = tax haven) 
All  0-4 million 0-1.5 million 0-1 million 
Qataro Qataro Qataro Qataro 
Luxembourg* Luxembourg* Luxembourg* Luxembourg* 
Macao* Macao* Macao* Macao* 
Singapore* Singapore* Bruneig Bruneig 
Bruneig Bruneig Iceland Iceland 
United Arab Emirateso United Arab Emirateso Malta* Malta* 
Ireland Iceland Cyprus* Cyprus* 
Switzerland* New Zealand Trinidad & Tobago* Seychelles* 
Norwayo Malta* Estonia St. Kitts & Nevis* 
Hong Kong* Slovenia Seychelles* Equitorial Guineao 
5 Tax Havens 4 Tax Havens 6 Tax Havens 6 Tax Havens 
4 Resource Dependent 
States 
3 Resource Dependent 
States 
2 Resource Dependent 
States 
3 Resource Dependent 
States 
Data Source: UN Population Division, World Bank 
 
Looking in greater detail at small states that are not tax havens (see Table 1.3), of  the 
61 states on which data was available, 16 are resource dependent. Of  the resource dependent 
states, 9 are petrostates, 2 are gas states, and the remaining are mining, either iron, copper, 
7 And a convincing case could be made that Ireland’s economy has benefited greatly from a 
preferential tax regime.  
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diamonds, gold, or bauxite. Of  remaining 45 small states that are neither tax havens nor 
resource dependent, 17 are agriculture-based (most of  those being subsistence agriculture), 
10 are basically industrial, 10 are tourism-based, 6 are fishing-based islands, Namibia, which 
manages to be have a mining-based economy without being classified by the IMF as 
resource dependent, and Djibouti, which the CIA World Factbook lists as having a “port 
services” based economy, which is a polite term for piracy (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, 
Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012; Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Based on this 
descriptive analysis, and with a few exceptions, small states that are wealthy are either tax 
havens or resource dependent states. Since, by definition, states either have natural resources 
on which to be dependent or they do not, tax havens are, in effect, creating a virtual resource 
on which they become dependent. This conclusion is supported in part by the observation 
that only two states out of  51 tax havens and 47 resource dependent states are classified as 
both tax havens and resource dependent states: Bahrain and Malaysia. Either the prosperous 
small state develops the resources it has, or it creates its own through lowering taxes and 
stiffening secrecy laws. 
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Table 1.3: Non-Tax Haven States, by Economic Base and Population Range 
 (resource dependent states in italics)  
1.5 million > 4 million  
7 resource dependent, 9 Non-
resource dependent 
1 million > 1.5 million  
3 resource dependent, 3 non-
resource dependent  
Zero > 1 million  
6 resource dependent, 24 non-
resource dependent) 
Albania (agriculture) Botswana (diamonds) American Samoa (fishing) 
Armenia (agriculture) Estonia (industry) Bhutan (agriculture) 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(industry) Gabon (oil) Brunei (gas) 
Central African Republic 
(agriculture) Guinea-Bissau (agriculture) Cabo Verde (tourism) 
Congo, Rep. of  (oil) Namibia (mining) Comoros (agriculture) 
Eritrea (agriculture) Trinidad & Tobago (gas) Djibouti (port services) 
Jamaica (tourism)  Equatorial Guinea (oil) 
Kosovo (agriculture)  Faroe Islands (fishing) 
Kuwait (oil)  Fiji (tourism) 
Lesotho (industry)  French Polynesia (tourism) 
Lithuania (industry)  Gambia (agriculture) 
Macedonia (industry)  Greenland (fishing) 
Mauritania (iron ore)  Guam (tourism) 
Moldova (agriculture)  Guyana (gold and bauxite) 
Mongolia (copper)  Iceland (fishing) 
New Zealand (industry)  Kiribati (fishing) 
Nicaragua (agriculture)  Micronesia (agriculture) 
Oman (oil)  Montenegro (tourism) 
Puerto Rico (industry)  New Caledonia (industry) 
Slovenia (industry)  
Northern Mariana Islands 
(tourism) 
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Table 1.3, continued   
Togo (agriculture)  Palau (tourism) 
Turkmenistan (oil)  Qatar (oil) 
United Arab Emirates (oil)  
Sao Tome and Principe 
(agriculture) 
Uruguay (agriculture)  
Sint Maarten (Dutch) 
(tourism) 
West Bank and Gaza 
(industry)  
Solomon Islands 
(agriculture) 
  
St. Martin (French) 
(tourism) 
  Suriname (minerals) 
  Swaziland (agriculture) 
  Timor-Leste (oil) 
  Tuvalu (fishing) 
 
Cost: Becoming a Tax Haven is Not a Foolproof  Development Strategy 
Becoming a tax haven does not always guarantee a state prosperity, however. It is not 
enough merely to change the laws and wait for the money to arrive: a tax haven must 
develop a reputation in the global finance community as a tax haven that is both stable 
politically and economically and competitive enough either in general or in a particular niche 
to warrant opening bank branches and shifting accounts around. Pace Hines (2005) and 
Armstrong et al (1998), averaging GDP per capita growth rates from 1970 to 2016 
demonstrates that becoming a tax haven is not a guarantee that the economy will grow 
steadily. Three jurisdictions – Aruba, Liberia, and Andorra – had negative growth rates, while 
six more – Bahrain, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, Barbados, and Switzerland – had positive 
growth rates of  less than 1%. Even so, 39 out of  42 tax havens had positive GDP growth 
rates for 1970-2016. And becoming a tax haven seems to make small states better off  than 
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being resource dependent or just not being a tax haven: the average GDP growth rate for 
resource depdendent states with populations of  4 million or fewer from 1970-2016 is 1.95%, 
compared the tax haven average of  2.59% over the same time period, while small states that 
were neither tax havens nor resource dependent had an average of  1.91%. Of  the 17 small 
resource dependent states, three – Kuwait, UAE, and Brunei - had negative GDP growth 
rates, with three more – Suriname, Mauritania, and Qatar – having GDP growth rates of  less 
than 1%. States with populations of  four million or fewer who are neither tax havens nor 
resource dependent fared worse than either tax havens or resource dependent small states: 
of  the 42 jurisidictions with data available, seven have negative average GDP growth rates 
while another eight have average growth rates of  less than 1%. So, while the evidence 
provideded by this first cut suggests that becoming a tax haven is not a guaranteed path to 
financial stability for a jurisdiction, it does seem to be better than the alternatives with which 
small states are faced (see Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.4: Average Small State GDP Growth Rate, 1970-2016 for Tax Havens, Resource Dependent 
States, and Other Small States* 
Jurisdiction 
Tax Haven Rate 
(%) 
Resource Dependent 
Rate (%) 
Other Small States 
Rate (%) 
Albania   2.70 
American Samoa   -0.53 
Andorra -0.13   
Antigua & Barbuda 2.98   
Armenia   3.84 
Aruba -0.92   
Bahamas 0.12   
Bahrain 0.25   
Barbados 0.65   
Belize 2.67   
Bermuda 1.61   
Bhutan   5.56 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   10.93 
Botswana  5.67  
Brunei  -0.71  
Cabo Verde   4.74 
Central African Republic   -1.02 
Channel Islands 1.01   
Comoros   -0.31 
Congo, Rep. of  1.38  
Costa Rica 2.21   
Cyprus 3.37   
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Table 1.4, continued    
Djibouti   0.11 
Dominica 2.76   
Equatorial Guinea  10.90  
Eritrea   1.88 
Estonia   4.53 
Fiji   1.78 
French Polynesia   1.72 
Gabon  1.23  
Gambia   0.44 
Greenland   2.28 
Grenada 2.85   
Guam   1.14 
Guinea-Bissau   0.60 
Guyana  1.60  
Hong Kong 4.23   
Iceland   2.63 
Isle of  Man 5.68   
Jamaica   0.40 
Jordan 1.84   
Kiribati   -0.40 
Kosovo   4.67 
Kuwait  -2.63  
Latvia 5.31   
Lebanon 1.43   
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Table 1.4, continued    
Lesotho   3.14 
Liberia -1.43   
Liechtenstein 2.41   
Lithuania   5.48 
Luxembourg 2.60   
Macao 3.77   
Macedonia   1.24 
Maldives 4.01   
Malta 4.43   
Marshall Islands 1.39   
Mauritania    
Mauritius 3.70   
Micronesia   0.73 
Moldova   3.22 
Monaco 1.99   
Mongolia  3.02  
Montenegro   2.38 
Namibia   0.95 
Nauru 14.62   
New Caledonia   1.44 
New Zealand   1.41 
Nicaragua   -0.07 
Northern Mariana Islands   -2.60 
Oman  1.76  
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Table 1.4, continued    
Palau   -0.30 
Panama 2.71   
Puerto Rico   2.12 
Qatar  0.63  
Samoa 1.64   
San Marino 2.48   
Sao Tome and Principe   2.58 
Seychelles 3.30   
Singapore 4.88   
Slovenia   2.37 
Solomon Islands   0.73 
St. Kitts & Nevis 3.64   
St. Lucia 2.26   
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 3.18   
Suriname  0.16  
Swaziland   2.72 
Switzerland 0.93   
Timor-Leste  4.03  
Togo   0.03 
Tonga 1.59   
Trinidad & Tobago  1.87  
Turkmenistan  3.73  
Tuvalu   1.52 
Vanuatu 0.60   
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Table 1.4, continued    
United Arab Emirates  -1.97  
Uruguay   2.08 
US Virgin Islands 0.41   
West Bank and Gaza Strip   1.66 
Average 2.59 1.95 1.91 
All states on list – with the exception of  Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Switzerland – have 
populations of  4 million or fewer. 
 
Cost: Tax Havens Become Renegade States 
One of  the central ironies of  the tax haven world is that in order to become a 
successful tax haven, a jurisdiction must develop a positive reputation in the international 
banking community while at the same time gaining a negative one in the international legal 
and diplomatic community. Reputation is critical to developing a clientele as a tax haven, but 
jurisdictions that do so – especially if  they perceived to be doing so actively and eagerly – 
also develop the reputation as a “renegade” state (Eden & Kudrle, 2005) in the international 
community; that is, not quite the pariah status of  North Korea or Iran, for example, but not 
a member in good standing of  the international community either.  
Generally speaking, a renegade state is one whose “practices are salient to an 
international regime but whose behavior does not comply with the descriptive norms and 
practices of  that regime” (Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 106). A renegade state cannot just be 
written off  and ignored; its behavior affects the behavior of  the other states in the regime, 
and therefore the ultimate success of  the regime itself. In the case of  tax havens, they are 
renegades in the regime of  international tax harmonization and cooperation the developed 
states of  the world are attempting to create through IGOs like the OECD and the Financial 
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Action Task Force (FATF). As the European states watched the unsuccessful US effort to 
attack the problem of  lost tax revenue to Caribbean tax havens in the 1980s, they agreed to 
use existing IGOs to create tax harmonization regimes. These regimes had three stated goals: 
1) international equity, or clarifying which jurisdiction can rightfully tax which income, and 
that tax revenue is distributed fairly among jurisdictions; 2) international neutrality, or 
creating a tax system that does not influence individual or firm investment decisions; and 3) 
taxpayer equity, or equal treatment of  individuals within a jurisdiction regardless of  the 
source of  their income. The underlying idea behind the tax harmonization regimes was that 
these goals could not be achieved unilaterally, no matter how rich and powerful the state 
(Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Maurer, 2008).  
During the 1990’s, the impetus to create tax harmonization regimes came from 
Europe. The Bank for International Settlements formed the Basel Committee in 1974 to 
improve financial stability by increasing cross-border banking supervision and cooperation. 
The Committee is essentially reactive, having been formed in the wake of  the European 
financial crises of  1974 and spurred by the failure of  BCCI in 1991, created the Working 
Group on Cross-Border Banking, which worked with two groups of  tax haven-based 
bankers and insurers to create the Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision in 1997. 
Following the Basel Committee’s lead, the G-7 created two working groups: The Finance 
Ministers’ Working Group on Financial Crimes; and the Financial Experts Group. (BIS, 
2017; Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Maurer, 2008). 
The reports by the Working Groups led to an increased effort on the part of  the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to focus on tax haven activity and on the operations of  a 
specific group of  jurisdictions. The efforts by the Basel Committee and the G-7 represented 
the more traditional collaborative method of  addressing problems within the community of  
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nations, i.e. working with representatives of  the renegade states themselves to achieve 
specific policy goals. In the case of  the FSF, and then the OECD and the FATF, the process 
used was more aggressive. By 2000, all three groups had gone the additional step beyond 
studying and consultation and released blacklists of  tax havens whose practices did not 
conform to the standards the IGO created.8 In the case of  the FSF, these were  jurisdictions 
in various stages of  non-compliance with regulatory standards of  cross-border cooperation. 
For the FATF, the blacklisted jurisdictions were those that did not cooperate with them in 
implementing their list of  best practices for fighting money laundering. Finally, and most 
significantly, the OECD created a Forum on Harmful Tax Competition after releasing a 
report on harmful tax comeptition in 1998. This forum then released a list of  41 tax havens, 
a blacklist whose impact was so great that six jurisdictions agreed to compliance measures 
before the list was even released. All three of  these lists were released within a few weeks of  
each other in the spring of  2000, and as such represented the spearhead of  the international 
effort to curtail tax haven activity. In terms of  Nadelmann’s (1990) five stages of  prohibition 
regime formation, the IGOs had progressed through stages one – legitimate activity – and 
two – redefining activity as a problem – and arrived at stage three – formation of  criminal 
conventions. The list of  tax havens in this study and their presence on the three blacklists is 
summarized in Table 1.5 (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; FATF, 2000; FSF, 2000; Hampton & 
Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Kudrle R. T., 2009; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 1998). 
8 These standards, in their most basic form: little to no tax on income from financial services; 
different tax rates and regulations for financial services than for other industries in jurisdiction; laws enforcing a 
lack of transparency in financial service activity disclosure; and an absence of laws regulating information 
sharing with other jurisdictions or IGOs. (Maurer, 2008) 
36
Table 1.5: Tax Havens on OECD, FATF, and FSF Blacklists, 2000 
Jurisdiction 
OECD FATF FSF 
Andorra X  X 
Anguilla X  X 
Antigua & Barbuda X  X 
Aruba X  X 
Bahamas X X X 
Bahrain X  X 
Barbados X  X 
Belize X  X 
Bermuda X (cooperating)  X 
British Virgin Islands X  X 
Cayman Islands X X X 
Cook Islands X (cooperating) X X 
Costa Rica   X 
Curacao X (as Netherlands Antilles)  X 
Cyprus X (cooperating)  X 
Dominica X X  
Gibraltar X  X 
Grenada X X  
Guernsey X  X 
Hong Kong    
Isle of  Man X  X 
Jersey X  X 
Jordan    
37
Table 1.5, continued    
Latvia (OECD member)   
Lebanon  X X 
Liberia X   
Liechtenstein X X X 
Luxembourg (OECD member)   
Macao   X 
Malaysia    
Maldives X   
Malta X (cooperating)  X 
Marshall Islands X X X 
Mauritius X (cooperating)  X 
Monaco X  X 
Montserrat X   
Nauru X X X 
Niue X X X 
Panama X X X 
Samoa X  X 
San Marino X (cooperating)   
Seychelles X  X 
Singapore    
St. Kitts & Nevis X X X 
St. Lucia X  X 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines X X X 
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Table 1.5, continued    
Switzerland (OECD member)   
Tonga X   
Turks & Caicos X  X 
Vanuatu X  X 
Virgin Islands (US) X   
Sources: (Dharmapala, 2008; Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Gravelle, 2015; Haberly & Wojcik, 
2015; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 2017)  
NOTE: The FSF also created a “Major Financial Centers” list at the same time, and this 
list includes Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Singapore, and Switzerland. These 
jurisdictions received FSF questionnaires regarding offshore activities and never 
responded. 
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Benefit: International Community Punishes Renegade States Ineffectively 
The main problem with the blacklist effort led by the OECD is that it was 
compromised from the start. Part of  the difficulty multi-lateral efforts to discipline tax 
havens face are the result of  the historical relationships the enforcing states bear to the tax 
havens. Many of  the existing tax havens started their Westphalian existences as colonies of  
the British Empire, giving them access not just to the English common law tradition, but 
also to a potential customer pool for their services. Of  the 51 tax havens, 41 were on the 
OECD 2000 blacklist. Of  these 41, 19 had a direct, legal link to an OECD member state, 
while three of  the 51 (Latvia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) were member states 
themselves. Perhaps unsurprisingly, none of  the three OECD member states were 
blacklisted, although they were not the only ones to benefit: every other non-independent 
tax haven was blacklisted, although six chose to cooperate with the OECD almost 
immediately. In the end, everyone cooperated in one form or another, such that the OECD 
currently has no jurisdictions blacklisted as uncooperative, with European states Andorra, 
Liechtenstein, and Monaco being the last eliminated in 2009. With nearly half  the tax havens 
on the blacklist linked to member states, blanket cooperation was the expected outcome 
(Eden & Kudrle, 2005; OECD, 2017). 
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Table 1.6: Tax Havens and their Relationship to OECD Countries 
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Type and Linkage 
    OECD 
Link 
On OECD List 
(2000)?  
Andorra 
Co-principality between France 
and Spain  
   France, 
Spain Yes 
Anguilla UK overseas territory UK Yes 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Aruba Part of  Netherlands 
    
Netherlands Yes 
Bahamas 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Bahrain Independent   Yes 
Barbados 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Belize 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Bermuda UK overseas territory UK Cooperating 
British Virgin 
Islands UK overseas territory UK Yes 
Cayman Islands UK overseas territory UK Yes 
Cook Islands 
Free association with New 
Zealand 
    New 
Zealand Cooperating  
Costa Rica Independent   No 
Curacao 
Autonomous within 
Netherlands 
     
Netherlands 
Yes (as part of  
Netherlands 
Antilles) 
Cyprus 
Independent, commonwealth 
member   Cooperating 
Dominica 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Gibraltar UK overseas territory UK Yes 
Grenada 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Guernsey British crown dependency UK Yes 
Hong Kong 
Special administrative region of  
China  No 
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Table 1.6, 
continued    
Isle of  Man British crown dependency UK Yes 
Jersey British crown dependency UK Yes 
Jordan Independent  No 
Latvia OECD member           Latvia No 
Lebanon Independent  No 
Liberia Independent  Yes 
Liechtenstein Independent  Yes 
Luxembourg OECD member 
       
Luxembourg No 
Macao 
Special administrative region of  
China  No 
Malaysia Independent  No 
Maldives 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Malta 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Cooperating 
Marshall Islands 
Independent, free association 
with US US Yes 
Mauritius 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Cooperating 
Monaco Independent  Yes 
Montserrat UK overseas territory UK Yes 
Nauru 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Niue 
Free association with New 
Zealand New Zealand Yes 
Panama Independent   Yes 
Samoa 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
San Marino 
Independent city state in free 
association with Italy       Italy Cooperating 
Seychelles 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
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Table 1.6, 
continued    
Singapore 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  No 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
St. Lucia 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Switzerland OECD Member  Switzerland No 
Tonga 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Turks & Caicos UK overseas territory        UK Yes 
Vanuatu 
Independent, commonwealth 
member  Yes 
Virgin Islands 
(US) US overseas territory         US Yes  
Source: Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 116-8 
 
The irony here is that the campaigns to name and shame were not failures as such. 
The IGOs were able to get tax havens to successfully comply with their requirements and 
were able to either wind the programs down or shift the focus to terrorism financing and 
money laundering for organized crime by the end of  the decade. From the six early adopters 
to the last holdouts, every jurisdiction on the blacklist made a commitment to increased 
transparency and improved exchange of  information. The problem is that compliance 
required a relatively small amount of  effort on the part of  the tax havens. For example, a tax 
haven could get itself  reclassified as “cooperative” by the OECD by issuing a press release 
stating that the government of  the jurisdiction intended to adopt the OCED’s Memorandum 
of  Understanding, i.e. by promising to change their behavior rather than actually changing it. 
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In fact, 31 of  the jurisdictions on the OECD blacklist had done just that by September, 
2003. In addition, the FSF announced on March 11, 2005 that their own blacklist was “no 
longer operative” (Kudrle R. T., 2009: 36). Granted, this compliance has resulted in changes 
in tax haven behavior – the establishment of  stand-alone financial services commissions, the 
creation of  corporate registries where none had previously existed, the increased use of  laws 
like Know Your Customer and other due diligence requirements. The impact of  these 
regimes on tax haven behavior, however, has been limited, and the continued use of  tax 
havens for tax avoidance and evasion, as well as money laundering and terrorism financing 
has not changed much (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 2017). 
The preliminary analysis bears this conclusion out. Average GDP per capita growth 
rates for tax havens with a population of  fewer than four million people decreased from an 
average of  2.62% for the period of  1970-2000 to an average of  1.90% for the period 2001-
2016, for an overall average of  2.58%, meaning that, on average, growth slowed in tax 
havens after the naming and shaming campaigns, but did not reverse or stop. By contrast, 
resource dependent states experienced the opposite trend, increasing from an average GDP 
per capita growth rate of  1.38% for the period of  1970-2000 to an average of  2.33%, 
possibly as the result of  Iraq War-era increases in oil prices, although an overall average 
increase of  2.03% suggests that the tax haven strategy might be a profitable economic 
development model. Finally, small states that were neither tax havens nor resource 
dependent demonstrated the same trend as tax havens, dropping from an average GDP 
growth rate of  1.97 for the period of  1970-2000 to an average of  1.82% for the period of  
2001-2016, for an overall average of  1.92% for the entire period. That non-tax haven states 
experienced a similar, though less extreme, trend as tax havens in economic growth implies 
that perhaps other macroeconomic factors were responsible for the general decrease in tax 
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haven growth rates in the 21st century rather than the blacklist campaign, but clearly more 
sophisticated analysis is necessary (see Table 1.7). 
Table 1.7: Average GDP Per Capita Growth Rate (%), 1970-2016, populations lower than 4 
million  
 
Tax Havens 
(n=38) 
Resource Dependent States 
(n=16) 
Other Small States 
(n=42) 
1970-2016 2.58 2.03 1.92 
1970-2000 2.62 1.38 1.97 
2001-2016 1.90 2.33 1.82 
Data Source: IMF World Development Indicators 
 
The preliminary analysis also helps illustrate the reasons why a jurisdiction would 
choose to become a tax haven, even in the face of  universal disapprobation: 1) in the 
absence of  natural resources, it’s a comparatively successful economic development strategy; 
and 2) the practical impact of  that disapprobation is relatively low. Only one jurisdiction – 
Malaysia – can be classified both a tax haven and a resource dependent state, further 
reinforcing the argument that jurisdictions become tax havens in order to create a virtual 
resource as an economic base. Lacking any resources of  their own to create inflows foreign 
banking and commercial activity, these jurisdictions choose an alternative in a process that 
one would be hard pressed to be called random. As is evident from Table 1.8, tax havens 
cluster in neighborhoods like the Caribbean, or the mountains of  western Europe, or the 
South Pacific. This clustering behavior is to be expected, given that a jurisdiction’s response 
to a regime is dictated more by that jurisdiction’s neighbors’ responses than by the regime 
itself; that is, it follows logically that there would be groups of  jurisdictions out of  
compliance with the tax harmonization regime IGOs like the OECD are attempting to 
impose (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Simmons, 2000). 
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In addition, jurisdictional decision-making vis a vis becoming a tax haven might also 
be affected by their prior colonial relationships. According to the information presented in 
Table 1.6, approximately half  of  all tax havens were either British colonies or are still 
dependencies. In addition to providing them access to British common law precedents 
enabling tax haven behavior, these jurisdictions’ status makes them a natural market for 
British individuals and corporations seeking to avoid British corporate taxation. Since Britain 
is one of  the world’s largest economies,9 becoming a tax haven for British citizens both 
individual and corporate can be a lucrative pursuit. In ranking the top five tax havens by 
average GDP per capita, two – the Cayman Islands and Bermuda - are Crown dependencies. 
In the case of  the Caribbean tax havens, this colonial relationship with Britain meant that, 
once the colonies declared their independence, the tax treaty the US and Britain signed in 
1945 now applied to them as well, allowing both American and British businesses to use 
these new jurisdictions to find the most advantageous tax deal legally. That tax havens have 
existing relationships with developed states also helps explain why citizens of  those states 
would become tax haven customers, even as their governments’ official statements decry the 
practice. In fact, the bulk of  tax havens’ incorporation and banking activity originates in 
OECD states, despite the OECD being the primary organization involved in blacklisting tax 
havens. The source of  the ambivalence in OECD states is that decision-makers are trying to 
simultaneously accomplish two opposing policy goals: 1) create an international tax regime 
that doesn’t result in taxable income escaping to the tax havens; and 2) creating a business 
environment for businesses in which they can compete, both domestically and 
internationally. These goals became even more difficult to accomplish in the face of  a 
9 Great Britain had the fifth highest level of GDP of all states in 2016, behind only the US, China, 
Japan, and Germany, according to the IMF.  
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distinct lack of  official enthusiasm for punishing tax havens from the Bush administration in 
the US in 2001, as well as the continuing prominence of  a brace of  well-funded advocacy 
groups in both Washington DC and London arguing that unfettered tax competition was 
actually a net economic good (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Maurer, 2008). 
Table 1.8: Tax Havens by Geographic Region (islands in bold; n = 33) 
Europe (13) 
  
Andorra Cyprus Gibraltar 
Guernsey Isle of  Man Jersey 
Latvia Liechtenstein Luxembourg 
Malta Monaco San Marino 
Switzerland   
Caribbean (17)   
Anguilla Antigua & Barbuda Aruba 
Bahamas Barbados Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands Cayman Islands Curacao 
Dominica Grenada Montserrat 
St. Kitts & Nevis St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Turks & Caicos Virgin Islands (US)  
South Pacific (7)   
Cook Islands Marshall Islands Nauru 
Niue Samoa Tonga 
Vanuatu   
East and Southeast Asia (5)   
Hong Kong Macao Malaysia 
Maldives Singapore  
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Table 1.8, continued   
Africa (3)   
Liberia Mauritius Seychelles 
Middle East (3)   
Bahrain Jordan  Lebanon 
Central America (3)   
Belize Costa Rica Panama 
 
  
 
This ambivalence demonstrated towards tax havens by the developed world as a 
result of  colonial legacy is a key variable in determining whether a jurisdiction will become – 
or remain – a tax haven, but there additional political and economic factors. Frequently, 
jurisdictions that become tax havens are islands; as Table 1.8 shows, 33 of  the 51 tax havens 
in this dissertation are islands. Small island economies tend to have a series of  economic 
disadvantages similar to remote areas, including “restricted comparative advantages, 
diseconomies of  scale, dysfunctional market structures, high transport costs… limited 
natural resources, small labor markets, and deficiencies in professional and institutional 
knowledge and experience” (Hampton & Christensen, 2002: 1663). These disadvantages can 
limit a jurisdiction’s options for economic development; limited natural resources and a 
generally inability to industrialize or farm on a large scale makes the decision to become a tax 
haven an obvious one, as long as the jurisdiction believes the benefits outweigh the costs, 
and that the jurisdiction can profit from renegade behavior (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; 
Nadelmann 1990). 
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In addition, other attributes the jurisdiction may have may also prejudice their 
decision in favor of  becoming a tax haven. First, and most important, they have their 
sovereignty which, even at its most limited in the case of  the dependencies, is still sufficient 
to create the legal and financial institutions necessary to become a tax haven. While tax 
havens tend to be better governed than non-tax haven small states, they may lack certain 
elements of  civic and political life that promote organized opposition, such as an 
independent media, organized opposition parties, or institutions of  higher education. The 
stability created by this better governance is critical to tax haven development; investors are 
attracted to stability so states with more stable governments will have higher levels of  FDI 
than states with less stable governments. In addition, states with more stable governments 
are more likely to become tax havens than states with less stable governments. This tendency 
could also be driving investment; rather than foregoing short term profits by investing in 
stable states, as Barry, Clay, & Flynn (2013) suggest, multinational corporations are actually 
seeking out higher profits by investing in states more likely to be tax havens. In addition, the 
remoteness of  the islands can foster a culture of  insularity, one that values unity and secrecy, 
and discourages whistle-blowing or outward transparency. This remoteness also creates a 
literal barrier between the islands and the ruling authorities, whether the colonizer or any 
mainland-based IGOs that give the islands a certain level of  autonomy (Dharmapala, 2008; 
Hampton & Christensen, 2002). 
All small states and islands have many, if  not most of, these characteristics, but what 
makes the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands more likely to become tax havens than Cuba 
and Jamaica? Two factors, which this dissertation will analyze in greater depth in the next 
chapter: 1) stable governments that encourage foreign investment; and 2) the ability to 
benefit from renegade behavior despite the application of  international regimes designed to 
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curtail this behavior. The analysis carried out will focus mainly on determining the key 
political and economic differences between jurisdictions with small populations that are tax 
havens and ones that are not, as well as the nature of  the impact the coordinated 
international anti-tax haven campaigns had on tax havens, and the foreign individuals and 
firms that patronized them.  
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Chapter Two  
The Scope of  Tax Haven Impact and the Ways in which that Impact is Felt  
Two hundred and fifty-six trillion dollars. That’s Credit Suisse’s Research Institute’s 
estimate for the total amount of  wealth in the world, i.e. “the value of  financial assets plus 
real estate (housing) owned by households, less their debts” (Kersley & Koutsoukis, 2016). If  
Gabriel Zucman’s (2015: 3) estimate that 8 percent of  this wealth is held in tax havens, then 
tax havens are holding around $20 trillion of  the world’s wealth. This calculation is 
consistent with those made by both Henry (2012: 5) and Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux 
(2010: 5). The sheer scope of  the financial traffic directed through tax havens demands 
serious analysis. In 2015, according to IMF data, 22% of  the world’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflow moved through tax havens, a calculation again consistent with the 
one made by Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux (2010: 52). That is, of  the $2.18 trillion of  FDI 
inflows recorded in 2015, nearly $480 billion was accounted for by tax havens (Gravelle, 
2015).10  
As these figures indicate, tax havens provide ample service to both individual and 
corporate clients.  Estimates for private wealth held in opaque accounts can run to be $7 and 
$9 trillion (Henry, 2012: 5), with bank deposits in tax havens running an estimated $3 trillion 
per year (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 62) and individual tax evasion via foreign tax 
haven accounts costing the US government around $50 billion (Gravelle, 2015: 27). In fact, a 
key customer for tax havens is the banks themselves, with the major global banks such as 
UBS, Citi, Barclays, and the aforementioned Credit Suisse accounting for between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of  all private wealth held in tax havens (Henry, 2012: 32). This wealth is 
10 Since some of the wealthier tax havens like Liechtenstein and the US Virgin Islands refuse to report 
their financials, that value is likely several billion dollars higher. 
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extremely mobile, with the top 21 of  the world’s private banks controlling at least $100 
billion of  cross-border assets, with cross-border lending traffic running at about $12 trillion 
per year (Henry, 2012: 32; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 51). This traffic has made 
tax havens disproportionately busy: although than have less than 1% of  the world’s non-US 
population, tax havens generate 2.3% of  the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) and host 
nearly 6% of  all US employees working overseas (Hines, 2005: 65). This activity is the result 
of  two basic impacts tax havens have on the level and location of  capital in jurisdictions: 1) 
the low level of  taxation the tax haven levies on income; and 2) the various ways in which 
tax havens can facilitate tax avoidance in jurisdictions other than their own (Hines, 2005).  
The Incorporation Business 
A significant amount of  this tax haven activity is generated by the creation and 
maintaining of  secrecy for both individual and corporate clients. In fact, one manifestation 
of  that secrecy is that the line between individual and corporate is made intentionally vague 
by tax havens. For example, law firms in the British Virgin Islands assist in the creation and 
registration of  30,000 corporations each year, while firms in the Seychelles register up to 
11,000 (Shaer, Hudson, & Williams, 2014). In addition to the processing fee of  a few 
hundred dollars to the firm, the tax havens themselves will charge licensing and registration 
fees that can cost from $150 on Vanuatu to around $400 on the Isle of  Man (Palan, Murphy, 
& Chavagneux, 2010: 31). In addition to giving clients a layer of  secrecy, the incorporation 
business is a key driver of  tax haven economic development: it provides jobs for law firms 
and government registration clerks and their support staffs, and generates a steady stream of  
income for the jurisdictions who attract the clients by not levying taxes on any income to 
these corporations. Regulatory cost theories of  corporate law and taxation provide an 
explanation for tax havens’ ability to profit from cheap incorporations: where a firm decides 
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to incorporate depends on how friendly the jurisdiction’s legal environment is, and how 
much it costs to incorporate. Tax havens provide legal environments at least as friendly as 
non-tax havens, as well as lower incorporation costs, developments which are facilitated by 
the growth in the incorporation law firm business, which makes the relocation and 
incorporation easier – and less expensive – than ever before (Becht, Mayer, & Wagner, 2008). 
Since the vast majority of  these corporations exist only in the tax haven registration account 
ledgers, on the hard drives of  the law firms and banks with which they conduct business, 
and as a brass plate on an office or as a post office box – that is, without any significant 
property, plant, or equipment – their maintenance cost the tax havens relatively little in 
capital outlays or cleaning up the types of  environmental disasters common to their 
resource-dependent jurisdictional brethren. As long as the client has Internet access with 
which to contact the law firms or banks and transfer money, the tax havens can serve their 
clients’ needs handily (Gravelle, 2015).  
Multi-National Corporations, Transfer Pricing, and Debt Manipulation 
Not all transactions are this simple, however. Multi-national corporations (MNCs) 
have created several complex, lucrative methods for taking advantage of  tax havens. The 
most popular method is transfer mispricing, or the manipulation of  prices of  goods or 
services sold across jurisdictions between subsidiaries of  a single MNC. Since more than 
half  of  all international trade is intra-MNC (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 18) – 
between different companies with the same owner – understanding transfer pricing is critical 
for understanding the role of  tax havens in international business. Transfer pricing is not 
inherently illegitimate; as long as the subsidiaries conduct the trade at an “arm’s length” as if  
they were unrelated firms in a competitive marketplace, with the seller setting a competitive 
price for the good or service being sold, then this is perceived by government tax authorities 
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as being a legitimate transaction. The extent to which an MNC uses the arm’s length pricing 
principle can depend on how willing – or able – a jurisdiction’s tax officials are to inquire 
about specific transactions. In Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD ) member countries, from which the phrase “arm’s length” originated, transaction 
challenges have become a matter of  course, whereas transactions in tax havens are less likely 
to be challenged.  Even if  the transaction is not necessarily “arm’s length” – the most 
common current example being a transaction involving intellectual property or another 
intangible good for which there is no easily established market price, or for a component of  
a finished product that is never sold on its own on the market – then it is possible for an 
MNC to enact transfer pricing without behaving in a way tax authorities consider abusive 
(Dharmapala, 2008; Gravelle, 2015; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010). 
A Hypothetical Example: Nike Plays Hide the Swoosh 
MNCs can also use the inherent uncertainty created by the sale of  intellectual 
property and by tax havens to create transfer mispricing. For example, Nike creates a specific 
company in Curacao to own its iconic swoosh logo. Nike then has one of  its subsidiaries 
located in the United States, where corporate taxes on income are relatively high, pay a 
licensing fee for the use of  the swoosh logo to the Curacao subsidiary, where corporate taxes 
on income are relatively low. The fee paid represents corporate income to the subsidiary, and 
the tax savings on the transaction represents profit gained from transfer pricing. Nike can 
also demonstrate the US-based subsidiary has spent money acquiring the rights to use the 
logo, making that subsidiary less profitable in a jurisdiction where taxes on profit are high, 
further lowering their tax bill. And since companies do not have to use country by country 
reporting of  their transactions in their accounting to tax authorities or shareholders, all 
anyone will see on a balance sheet is one subsidiary selling use of  its intellectual property to 
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another subsidiary. And it is possible the Curacao subsidiary will not have to report the 
transaction – or any of  its transactions – to any government tax authority. 
The Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich 
Apple Inc. pioneered a more virulent version of  transfer pricing called the “double 
Irish with a Dutch sandwich” (Duhigg & Kocieniewski, 2012). When Apple sells an iPhone 
to a customer in America, the proceeds from that sale go to an Apple subsidiary in Ireland, 
where taxes on corporate income are lower than in America. Ireland tax law has a loophole – 
which will be closed by 2020 – that allows corporations to transfer profits internationally 
without paying any tax on the transaction, thereby allowing Apple to transfer the profits 
from the American sale from the Irish subsidiary to one in the Cayman Islands, where no 
taxes and strict secrecy laws insure that the profits can stay hidden as long as Apple needs. 
Apple created a second subsidiary in Ireland (hence the name) to handle the sale of  its 
products in Europe. Apple then transfers its profits from the European sales to another 
subsidiary it has set up in the Netherlands where, thanks to OECD rules eliminating tax on 
transfers of  income between EU companies and permissive tax laws in the Netherlands, the 
resulting transfer to the first Irish subsidiary can be accomplished tax free, at which point the 
profits are again transferred to the Cayman Islands. This practice was soon adopted by 
Google and Microsoft, among other MNCs, and became so popular the Irish parliament was 
forced to close the loopholes enabling it (Duhigg & Kocieniewski, 2012; Gravelle, 2015). 
Some MNCs, however, will not bother with such baroque methods of  transfer pricing. The 
most basic technique is “reinvoicing” or “misinvoicing,” and involves paying a different price 
in a transaction than the one officially recorded, and then taking advantage of  secrecy laws 
to obscure the actual amount traded. Ways to misinvoice include misreporting the quality or 
grade of  the good being imported, charging too much or too little for goods or services, or 
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simply paying for goods and services that only exist on paper. It is possible that as much as 
$1 trillion a year in illicit money transfers occurs using transfer mispricing, half  of  which 
comes from developing countries and most of  which passes through tax havens (Baker, 
2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012). 
Earnings Stripping 
Another popular form is the strategic reallocation of  debt among different MNC 
subsidiaries, one version of  which is known as “earnings stripping.” In this case, the low 
corporate tax rates the tax havens offer is more important than the secrecy. The most basic 
version is for a subsidiary in a tax haven or other low-tax jurisdiction to make a loan to a 
subsidiary in a high-tax jurisdiction. The loan increases the firm’s costs – both in terms of  
the debt it takes on and the loan payments it must make - in the high-tax jurisdiction, 
lowering its tax bill there, while increasing its income – by creating an asset in the original 
loan and income in the loan payments - in the low-tax jurisdiction, thereby making its tax bill 
relatively low overall while creating cash. Another method of  earnings stripping is for the 
MNC to borrow more money from banks in high-tax jurisdictions than they do from banks 
in low-tax jurisdictions. This method can be especially useful if  the MNC operates in 
resource-dependent jurisdictions where extractive industries like oil, gas, or mining have high 
property, plant, and equipment costs. The MNC can strike a deal with the government for a 
tax rebate and take out operating loans in higher-tax jurisdictions and buy the property and 
buy and ship the equipment, concentrating all the debt in the high-tax jurisdiction and all the 
income low or zero tax resource dependent one. The income can then be funneled to a 
subsidiary in a tax haven. The bulk of  MNC cross-border operations involve either or both 
of  these methods, ensuring that FDI inflows into tax havens range into the trillions of  
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dollars (Dharmapala, 2008; Gravelle, 2015; Henry, 2012; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 
2010). 
Tax Havens Characteristics   
With this much money at stake, and the desire of  the world’s elites – both individual 
and corporate – to continue to utilize tax havens so palpable, the motivations for a 
jurisdiction to weaponize its sovereignty and become a tax haven are relatively clear. While 
the international anti-tax haven regime in the form of  the harmful tax competition 
campaigns by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) may represent an 
obstacle in the form of  damage to a jurisdiction’s reputation in the global community, the 
motivation – a viable economic development strategy in the face of  a paucity of  acceptable 
alternatives – may be stronger. In order to better understand this motivation, and the force 
countervailing it, it is important to examine the political, economic, and geographic 
characteristics of  the tax haven in depth, and compare tax havens to other jurisdictions with 
similar characteristics, specifically jurisdictions with small populations and who may or may 
not be resource-dependent. Furthermore, it is also important to more closely examine the 
international force arrayed against tax havens, and the form it takes as a vehicle for naming 
and shaming tax havens into what they classify as more acceptable state behavior. This 
examination will then lead to the development of  a series of  hypotheses and the analysis of  
data based on those hypotheses.  
Political Characteristics of  Tax Havens 
Independence 
Are tax havens states? The traditional concept of  Westphalian sovereignty denotes 
states as sovereign within their own borders; that is, a state has its own government and its 
own territory (Krasner, 1999). Using this concept to define tax havens as states, however, has 
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its limitations. To return to an example from the introduction, the Cayman Islands are 
technically a British Overseas Territory, meaning they are not independent from Great 
Britain and not sovereign. As such, they are not a member of  the United Nations (UN). The 
Caymans, however, are self-governing, and are sovereign enough to write and pass the 
secrecy laws that allowed them to become one of  the world’s most active financial centers 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). In the case of  tax havens, this type of  limited 
sovereignty is relatively common, and tax havens are just as often to meet Robert Jackson’s 
definition of  a quasi-state in lacking one of  the key components of  statehood, either control 
of  territory or political or bureaucratic autonomy (Jackson, 1990). While some tax havens 
may not be entirely politically or geographically sovereign, they are juridically so, at least to 
the extent that they can write, enact, and enforce their own laws and regulations; these tax 
havens are just sovereign enough, hence the use of  the term “jurisdiction” rather than 
“state” throughout this dissertation. 
A look at the list of  tax havens in Table 2.1 bears out a relative dearth of  sovereign 
states: of  the 51 total jurisdictions classified as tax havens, one-third (17) are non-self-
governing. Of  those 17, 10 have some level of  administrative relationship with the UK, and 
its secrecy-friendly system of  British common law, while the other seven are split among the 
Netherlands (2), New Zealand (2), China (2), and the US (1). In addition, another 
characteristic of  limited sovereignty that is relatively common in tax havens is their absence 
from the UN. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, every self-governing jurisdiction is also a UN 
member, and none of  the non-self-governing jurisdictions are UN members.  If  we consider 
the UN to be a stand-in for the concept of  the “community of  nations” whose norms the 
anti-tax haven campaigns seek to protect, then one-third of  all the jurisdictions already exist 
outside that community, including some of  the most active (Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
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Hong Kong). Further adding to the confusion, of  the 34 tax havens the UN has admitted, 
15 were admitted after they had began functioning as tax havens, including Switzerland, 
which was finally admitted in 2002. If  nothing else, these numbers further demonstrate the 
confllicted attitude the global community has regarding tax havens, and how the potential 
impact of  a campaign to deter tax haven behavior could be compromised (UN, 2017). 
Table 2.1: Tax Havens Grouped by Sovereign Status 
Self-Governing (n=34) Non-Self-Governing (n=17)  
Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Dominica, Grenada, Jordan, Latvia. Lebanon, 
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
Monaco, Nauru, Panama, San Marino, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 
Switzerland, Tonga, Vanuatu 
United Kingdom (10): Anguilla, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of  Man, Jersey, 
Montserrat, Turks and Caicos; Netherlands 
(2): Aruba, Curacao; New Zealand (2): Cook 
Islands, Niue; China (2): Hong Kong, 
Macao; United States (1): Virgin Islands 
Source: Eden & Kudrle, 2005; UN, 2017; Vlcek, 2008 
Administering state in parentheses; UN members in italics 
 
Governance Quality 
Armed Conflict 
The relationship between tax haven status and governance quality is less ambiguous. 
When Dharmapala and Hines (2009) analyzed the World Governance Indicator data, they 
concluded that tax havens are signifcantly better governed than non-tax havens, providing 
three further questions: what do we mean by “governance quality?” Has this situation 
changed in the proceeding eight years? And, how do small state tax havens compare in 
governance quality to other small states, especially those that are resource dependent 
(Dharmapala & Hines, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011)? 
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If  jurisdictions make a conscious, rational decision to become tax havens as an 
economic development strategy in the absence of  better options, then it follows logically 
that the jurisdiction would have to have a decision-making apparatus, i.e. a governance 
structure, sufficiently sophisticated enough to weigh its options and make that decision. If, as 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009: 1058) concluded, “better-governed countries are much more 
likely than others to become tax havens,” then the concept of  tax havens as rational unitary 
actors in an anarchic system – after all, one of  the basic assumptions of  modern political 
scientific thought – making rational choices to enhance their economic health is a 
reasonable: we would expect states to maximiize their security, including their economic 
security, even at the expense of  the other states in the system. 
The jurisdictions that become tax havens are not typical states, however; they are, by 
comparison, small and weak. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, one-third depend on another state 
for their security. Of  the 51 total tax havens, only 19 (37%) have any armed forces at all, and 
those are all self-governed; not only are all 17 non-self-governed tax havens without military 
personnel, but 15 of  the self-governed tax havens are as well. Of  the tax havens that do have 
armed forces personnel, only Malaysia (128,267), Singapore (127,717), Jordan (115,964) and 
Lebanon (66,846) have an average number of  troops even approaching a typical state’s 
conventional force structure (World Bank, 2017). Given this limited force structure, there is 
no rational expectation that tax havens would use force unless there was no other option. 
In fact, most tax havens are strangers to any sort of  armed conflict since 1970 (see 
Table 2.2). According to the Armed Conflict Database (Allansson, Melander, & Themner, 
2017), only seven tax havens were involved in conflicts: Cyprus, Grenada, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Liberia, and Malaysia. For jurisdictions of  populations of  fewer than four million, the 
number drops to six out of  27, whereas non-tax haven states are more balanced, with 42 
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non-tax haven states experiencing conflict and 39 not out of  a total of  81. This comparison 
has a chi-squared value of  7.2 and a probability of  0.7% of  being a random difference. 
Resource dependent states with populations under four million have a similar split to tax 
havens, with seven resource dependent states involved in conflict, with 20 not involved. Of  
the 81 non-resource dependent states, however, conflict is even more rare, with 10 non-
resource dependent states involved in conflict and 71 not involved. This comparison, 
however, has a chi-squared value of  2.8 with a probability of  9.3% of  being random, 
suggesting that the difference between tax havens and non-tax havens is more stark than that 
between resource-dependent  and non-resource dependent states, a conclusion the “resource 
curse” literature bears out. Comparisons for jurisdictions with fewer than 1.5 million and 1 
million have similar results, reflecting the tendency for tax havens to be less conflict-prone. 
One caveat, however: small states are less likely to be conflict-prone in general, with chi-
squared values of  39 for four million, 57 for 1.5 million, and 55 for one million, all with a 
probability of  0 of  randomness. 
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Table 2.2: Conflict Location in States with Less Than Four Million, by Tax Haven and 
Resource Dependence Status  
Conflict Location 1970-2015 Yes No TOTAL 
Tax Haven 6 21 27 
Non-Tax Haven 42 39 81 
TOTAL 48 60 108 
Resource Dependent 7 20 27 
Non-Resource Dependent 10 71 81 
TOTAL  17 91 108 
Chi2 values: 7.2 (.007) for tax haven; 2.8 (.093) for resource dependent  
Data Source: Allansson, Melander, & Themner, 2017 
NOTE: only Bahrain is both a tax haven and resource dependent with a population under four 
million people, and it was not a conflict location. 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) in partnership with the World Bank in order to measure the comparative effectiveness 
of  the way in which each state exercises its authority. According to Kaufmann, Kray, and 
Mastruzzi (2011: 222), this exercise of  authority involves “(a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of  the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of  citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” With 
that in mind, Kaufmann et al created two indicators for each of  these three components. For 
“(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced,” they created 
indicators measuring “Voice and accountability” and “Political stability and absence of  
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violence/terrorism.” For “(b) the capacity of  the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies,” they created indicators measuring “Government Effectiveness” 
and “Regulatory Quality.” And finally, for “(c) the respect of  citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them, they created 
indicators measuring “Rule of  law” and “Control of  corruption” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2011: 223). In order for a jurisdictional government to make an effective decision 
regarding whether to become a tax haven, it would appear that all three components would 
be necessary, for citizens to be able to select competent leaders, and for those leaders to 
govern in a competent, responsive manner.  
Each governance indicator is measured on a scale from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best), 
making it possible to calculate an average of  WGI scores across indicators. For the purposes 
of  analysis, I have created three groups of  jurisidictions: 1) tax havens; 2) resource 
dependent; and 3) jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent. I will 
continue to measure these groups using population cutoffs of  4 million, 1.5 million, and 1 
million, based on definitions in the literature of  what constitutes a “small state” (Armstrong, 
De Kervenoael, Li, & Read, 1998; Vlcek, 2008). The purpose of  this categorization is to test 
the assumptions that tax havens are better governed than other states, and that this includes 
other small states, as weell as to understand the ways in which tax havens – which have 
created “virtual resources” – are different from actual resource dependent states. See the 
appendix for the various lists of  classification by status and population level. 
Governance Quality Hypotheses 
If  becoming a tax haven is a conscious economic development strategy decision, 
then the government making the decision must function at a relatively high level. The 
government must weigh the alternatives, consider the possibility of  punishment, and have a 
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government and polity stable enough to attract foreign investment. While it is true that small 
states in general will also have the features of  stable governance, tax havens with populations 
greater than 4 million should also have strong governance in order to function as a tax 
haven. Therefore, based on this argument, it is possible to generate the following two 
hypotheses:  
H1: Tax havens will have higher governance levels than non-tax havens, regardless of  population 
level. 
H2: Tax havens with small populations will have higher governance levels than non-tax havens 
with small populations. 
Bivariate Analysis  
As Table 2.3 shows, for all tax havens, the average WGI score is 0.65, with a t-score 
of  -5.84 and a probability that this result is due to chance of  .0001. By contrast, the average 
for all resource depdendent jurisdictions is -0.49 a t-score of  4.52 and a probability that this 
result is due to chance of  .0001. The results for average WGI score for jurisdictions that are 
neither tax havens nor resource dependent are not significant, which, considering the 
population includes every country in the world that is neither a tax haven nor resource 
dependent (121, as opposed to 46 tax havens and 47 resource dependent jurisdictions) and 
have no common unifying feature, is hardly surprising. In general terms, though, this result 
suggests that tax havens are better governed than resource dependent jurisdictions.  
As Table 2.3 also shows, however, the evidence that tax havens are better governed 
than other small states becomes stronger the smaller the populations get, as well as the 
evidence that smaller states are better governed overall. Additionally, the proportion of  
jurisdictions that are tax havens grows quite a bit, from 22% to 44%; that is, nearly half  the 
jurisdictions in the world with populations of  4 million or fewer are tax havens. While the 
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average WGI score for tax havens with fewer than 4 million people barely changes to 0.62, 
with the t-score changing -5.06 and the probability of  random outcome still at .0001, the 
result of  all but three tax havens (Switzerland, Malaysia, and Hong Kong) having 
populations of  4 million people or fewer. The results for the 55 other jurisdictions with 
populations of  4 million or fewer, however, are significantly different. Only 16 jurisdictions 
at this population level are resource dependent, and these 16 are significantly better 
governed than states that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent, with an average 
WGI score of  -0.15, a t-score of  2.33, and probability that this is a random outcome of  
0.011. Furthermore, now that the jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource 
dependent and with populations of  4 million or fewer have the elements in common that 
make small states better governed, their results are now significant. These “neither” 
jurisdictions have an average WGI of  -0.03, a t-score of  3.01, and a probability that is is a 
random outcome of  0.002. Again, these results suggest that jurisdictions with four million 
people or fewer do in fact have elements in common that make them better governed, while 
tax havens are much better governed than non-tax havens, and jurisdictions that are neither 
tax havens nor resource dependent are better governed than resource dependent 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, while resource dependent jurisdictions tend to be worse 
governed overall, resource dependent jurisdictions with populations of  4 million people or 
fewer are better governed than resource dependent jurisdictions with larger populations.  
As Table 2.3 further shows, as the population parameters get more restrictive, the 
probability that a jurisdiction is a tax haven is closer to being the rule rather than the 
exception. Of  the 67 jurisdictions with populations of  1.5 million people or fewer, 36 (53%) 
are tax havens, with the numbers of  resource dependent jurisdictions and jurisdictions that 
are neither dropping off  more precipitously, with the “neither” group losing nearly half  its 
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members from the 4 million or fewer level, dropping from 39 to 21. As the numbers drop, 
the entire population will take on the characteristics of  the tax havens, whose WGI score 
rises to 0.70 with a t-score of  -4.29 and probability of  random outcome still at .0001. The 10 
resource dependent jurisdictions also increase their WGI score up to -0.08 with a t-score of  
2.55 and a probability of  random outcome of  0.007. Likewise, the group of  jurisdictions 
that are neither resource dependent not tax havens and have populations of  1.5 million or 
fewer have a substantially increased WGI score of  0.12 with a t-score of  2.39 and a 
probability of  random outcome of  0.01. As at the 4 million or fewer population level, tax 
havens continue to be better governed than non-tax havens, followed by jurisdictions that 
are neither tax havens nor resource dependent, and then resource dependent jurisdictions. 
Also as at the 4 million or fewer level, governance scores for resource dependent 
jurisdictions and the “neither” group are progressively higher at the 1.5 million population 
level than they were before. As populations get smaller, governance levels increase across the 
board. 
As Table 2.3 finally shows, the trend continues at the 1 million or fewer population 
level with one exception. The number of  jurisdictions in the world with populations of  1 
million or fewer is 60, with 35 (58%) of  those being tax havens. As a result of  the tax haven 
category losing only 1 jurisdiction, the numbers are virtually identical with those at 1.5 
million or fewer level. The same is true of  the numbers for the jurisdictions that are neither 
tax havens nor resource dependent; their number dropped from 21 to 18, and as a result 
their WGI score inched up to 0.13, with a t-score of  2.35 and a probability of  a random 
outcome at 0.011. By contrast, the number of  resource dependent jurisdictions with 1 
million or fewer is 7 – as opposed to 10 with 1.5 million or fewer – and the loss changed the 
results rather dramatically, with the WGI score dropping to -0.18 with a t-score of  2.67 and a 
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random outcome probability of  0.005, meaning that as resource dependent states dropped in 
population, they got slightly worse governed. This result does not change the overall picture, 
however: the pattern still holds, with tax havens being better governed than non-tax havens, 
while jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are better governed 
than resource dependent states at any “small state” level. These findings are consistent with 
what Dharmapala & Hines found in 2009 using the same data, although this analysis is more 
granular, befitting the more complex theoretical questions being asked.  
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Table 2.3: Average WGI Score, by population level  
All jurisdictions (n=214) 
 Average  t-score Pr (random) 
Tax Haven (n=46) 0.65 (.09) -5.84 0.0001 
Resource Dependent (n=47) -0.49 (.08) 4.52 0.0001 
Neither (n=121) -0.04 (.08) 0.82 0.205 
    
4 million people or fewer (n=98) 
Tax Haven (n=43) 0.62 (.09) -5.06 0.0001 
Resource Dependent (n=16) -0.15 (.17) 2.33 0.011 
Neither (n=39) -0.03 (.11) 3.01 0.002 
    
1.5 million people or fewer (n=67) 
Tax Haven (n=36) 0.70 (.09) -4.29 0.0001 
Resource Dependent (n=10) -0.08 (.20) 2.55 0.007 
Neither (n=21) 0.12 (.16) 2.39 0.010 
    
1 million people or fewer (n=60) 
Tax Haven (n=35) 0.70 (.09) -4.14 0.0001 
Resource Dependent (n=7) -0.18 (.25) 2.67 0.005 
Neither (n=18) 0.13 (.16) 2.35 0.011 
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As Table 2.4 demonstrates, tax havens govern in the same manner regardless of  
population size. In part, this result is due to most tax havens having populations of  one 
million or fewer people, meaning that the population being analyzed is not changing that 
much. However, the level of  consistency in the results for tax havens when the WGI scores 
are broken into their component parts is remarkable, and lends further support for the 
conclusions that: 1) tax havens are distinct subgroup of  states with their own set of  unique 
characteristics; 2) those characteristics include being relatively well-governed compared with 
non-tax havens. Specifically, tax havens excel at government selection, monitoring, and 
replacement processes, i.e. giving their citizens the ability to freely participate in choosing 
who governs, as well as protecting freedoms of  speech and assembly, and creating a stable 
political environment unlikley to suffer from political violence (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2011). These results are especially striking when compared with those of  resource 
dependent jurisdictions, which, consistent with the conclusions of  the “resource curse” 
literature, are weakest of  all at selection, monitoring, and replacement of  the three 
jurisdiction types, and in four out of  five population categories. Resource dependent 
jurisdictions are the least stable, regardless of  size (Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Robinson, 
Torvik, & Verdier, 2006). When it comes to small states, however, jurisidictions that are 
neither tax havens nor resource dependent are strongest at selection, monitoring, and 
replacement, but not as strong as tax havens.  
The second component of  the WGI score is the creation and implementation of  
sound policies, which includes analyzing the quality of  public services provided and the 
ability of  the government to create and implement sound, pro-growth laws and regulations 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). As Table 2.4 demonstrates, tax havens are uniformly 
better at this type of  governance than non-tax havens, although less effective at this 
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component of  governance than the other two areas. Again, the reverse is true for resource 
dependent jurisdictions, at least those jurisdictions larger than 4 million people, where sound 
policies are relatively stronger than the other two governance categories, although still much 
weaker than either tax havens or jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource 
dependent. In addition, small states that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are 
uniformly weakest at sound policies, featuring the lowest scores for each jurisdiction type at 
every small state population category. When it comes to generating and implementing sound 
policies, tax havens are better than non-tax havens at every population level, while resource 
dependent jurisdictions are more likely to be better than jurisdictions that are neither at 
sound policies in jurisdictions larger than 4 million, while jurisdictions that are neither are 
more likely to be better than resource dependent jurisdictions in jurisdictions smaller than 4 
million. 
The third and final component of  the WGI score is the creation of  respect for the 
rule of  law and the control of  corruption, or in general the maintainence of  respect among 
the citizenry and among members of  government for the institutions that enforce contracts, 
property rights, law enforcement, and the curtailment of  the use of  public power for private 
gain (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). Table 2.4 demonstrates that, as with the other 
two components, tax havens are uniformly better at this component than non-tax havens. 
And while tax havens are not as effective at creating respect for the rule of  law and control 
of  corruption as they are at selection, monitoring and replacement, they are more effective 
at these two components than they are at creating sound policies. Again, this is a matter of  
degree, as tax havens are much more effective at all three of  these components than are non-
tax havens. As also might be predicted from close study of  the resource curse literature, 
resource dependent jurisdictions are uniformly less effective at the rule of  law and 
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corruption component than are non-resource dependent jurisdictions, regardless of  
population size. Jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are more 
effective at this component than resource dependent jurisdictions, but less effective than tax 
havens at every small state population.  
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Table 2.4: WGI Component Rankings, by Jurisdiction Type and Population Level  
Results in italics are insignificant 
All Jurisdictions (n=213) 
 
Tax Havens (n=45)  Resource Dependent (n=47)  Neither (n=121)  
 
SMR .70 (.09)  SP  -.43 (.12)  LC  -.03 (.09)  
 
LC .65 (.11)  LC -.52 (.12)  SP -.05 (.09)  
 
SP  .57 (.13)  SMR -.54 (.11)  SMR -.32(.08)  
4 million people or fewer (n=97) 
 
Tax Havens (n=42)  Resource Dependent (n=16)  Neither (n=39)  
 
SMR .70 (.09)  SMR -.13 (.13)  SMR .14 (.13)  
 
LC  .60 (.11)  LC  -.15 (.19)  LC  -.02 (.12)  
 
SP .50 (.13)  SP -.16 (.21)  SP -.28 (.12)  
1.5 million people or fewer (n=66) 
 
Tax Havens (n=35)  Resource Dependent (n=10)  Neither (n=21)  
 
SMR .83 (.07)  SP  -.08 (.26)  SMR .43 (.16)  
 
LC  .69 (.10)  LC -.11 (.23)  LC  .21 (.18)  
 
SP .54 (.13)  SMR -.53 (.16)  SP -.23 (.18)  
1 million people or fewer (n=59) 
 
Tax Havens (n=34)  Resource Dependent (n=7)  Neither (n=18)  
 
SMR .84 (.07)  SP  -.16 (.34)  SMR .46 (.17)  
 
LC  .69 (.10)  LC  -.17 (.30)  LC  .21 (.18)  
 
SP .54 (.14)  SMR -.20 (.17)  SP -.28 (.18)  
WGI component abbreviations: 1) SMR = selection, monitoring, and replacement; 2) SP = sound policy; 
and 3) LC = law and corruption 
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Consistent with the conclusions reached by previous analyses of  small states, the 
lower the population levels get, the uniformly higher the WGI scores get across all 
jurisdiction types. This result is due in part to the idea that smaller states are easier to govern, 
but it also due to the reality that, the lower the population level gets, the more likely a 
jurisdiction is to be a tax haven, and as a result better governed.  
Regression Analysis 
As Table 2.5 demonstrates, there is support for both hypotheses. The governance 
independent variable is positive and significant at both population levels, suggesting that 
states that are tax havens are likely to have higher governance levels, and that this likelihood 
exists whether the jurisdiction is small or not. As the Small Island Economy research would 
predict (Hampton, 1996; Vlcek, 2008), islands also have a positive effect on tax haven status, 
as does, intermittently, FDI. As expected, UN membership has a negative impact on tax 
haven status, given how few tax havens are UN members. Given that the R2 suggests these 
independent variables explain about one-third of  the governance index’s impact on tax 
haven behavior, it is possible to conclude from this regression that jurisdictions that are tax 
havens, islands, and a relatively high standard of  living are also going to have relatively high 
governance levels. 
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Table 2.5 Logistic Regression of  Tax Havens, by Governance and population 
 
 
All States 4 million     
Governance 1.093** 1.417*   
 
World Bank 
Region 0.075    -0.042    
 
Island 1.915*** 2.220**  
 
GDP per 
Capita PPP -0.004 -0.040 
 
UN 
Membership -3.046**    -2.023    
 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment -0.0001 0.0015*    
 
Constant 0.330  0.124    
 
N 192    82    
 
Chi2 53.66    35.29    
 
Pseudo R2 0.294    0.3217    
 
Legend * p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Economic Characteristics of  Tax Havens 
There are four general ways in which tax havens are economically and financially 
distinct from non-tax havens: 1) outward-focused economic activity; 2) low or zero taxes; 3) 
more affluent; and 4) not resource dependent. It is the argument of  this dissertation that 
conditions 1), 2), and 3) are the results of  explicit economic policy development decisions 
and that 4) is a cause of  these decisions. Since low or zero taxes and resource dependence 
are more a question of  description rather than proof  and therefore do not require rigorous 
testing, this section of  the dissertation will generate and test hypotheses only concerning 
outward-focused economic activity and affluence. 
Outward-Focused Economic Activity 
Tax havens are jurisdictions that have made the economic development decision that, 
given the absence of  more globally-acceptable revenue-creating options like extracting 
natural resources or heavy industry, they would create the virtual resources of  low taxation 
and high secrecy using what sovereignty they have to do so. The economic result of  this 
decision is that their revenue source is almost entirely external, especially compared with 
non-tax havens. Since a jurisdiction’s tax haven activity – banking, accounting, company 
incorporation, and other related services - is recorded in economic statistics as an exporting 
of  financial services, the expected result of  a comparison of  exports as a percentage of  a 
jurisdictions Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be for tax havens to have a higher 
percentage of  exports as a percentage of  GDP than non-tax havens.11 
As Table 2.6 demonstrates, tax havens have higher percentages of  exports of  their 
GDPs than non-tax havens. In fact, when population is not accounted for, tax havens rely 
11 All results for exports and FDI as percentage of GDP for resource dependent states were 
insignificant, so the comparison presented is tax havens compared with non-tax havens. 
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on exports almost twice as much as non-tax havens – 65.22% versus 32.41%. This 
proportion moderates slightly at lower populations, with tax haven percentages dipping 
slightly (63.85% at 4 million, 64.57% at 1.5 million, and 64.97% at 1 million) and non-tax 
havens increasing in their dependence up to around 40% (40.53% at 4 million, 41.07% at 1.5 
million, and 39.75% at 1 million), but the relationship remains steady: regardless of  
population level, tax haven exports equate to two-thirds of  their GDPs, whereas non-tax 
havens stay between one-third and 41% of  theirs. Tax havens do in fact depend more heavily 
on exports for economic stability than non-tax havens.  
Another measure of  dependence on foreign business for economic stability is the 
extent to which a jurisdiction depends on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. Since 
tax havens, by policy design, according to the argument of  this dissertation, rely on FDI, 
their net FDI inflows as a percentage of  GDP should be higher than non-tax havens. The 
key to the tax haven economic development strategy is to look outward for its revenue. 
Lacking natural resources and the population to compete in heavy industry or the post-
industrial economic bases, the tax haven must develop the regulations and skills to attract 
foreign direct investment in its banks, incorporation businesses, and shell corporations. It 
therefore follows that tax havens will be more dependent on FDI inflows than non-tax 
havens, and as a result will have higher FDI inflows than non-tax havens. Based on this 
argument, it is possible to generate the following two hypotheses: 
H3: Tax havens will have higher levels of  FDI inflows than non-tax havens, regardless of  
population level. 
H4: Tax havens with small populations will have higher levels of  FDI inflows than non-tax 
havens with small populations. 
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Table 2.6: Average Exports as Percentage of  GDP 
All jurisidictions (n=199) 
 Average %  t-score Pr (random) 
Tax Haven (n=33) 65.22 (7.16) -7.55 0.0001 
Non-Tax Havens (n=166) 32.41 (1.32)   
    
4 million people or fewer (n=86) 
Tax Haven (n=30) 63.85 (7.63) -3.51 0.0004 
Non-Tax Havens (n=56) 40.53 (2.67)   
    
1.5 million or fewer people (n=55) 
Tax Haven (n=23) 64.57 (8.49) -2.79 0.004 
Non-Tax Havens (n=32) 41.07 (3.73)   
    
1 million or fewer people (n=48) 
Tax Haven (n=22) 64.97 (8.88) -2.69 0.005 
Non-Tax Havens (n=26) 39.75 (4.27)   
    
Data Source: World Bank    
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Bivariate Analysis 
As Table 2.7 demonstrates, this is true, although the results are less robust than they 
are for average exports. That said, the results are consistent: in general, tax havens have an 
average FDI net inflow of  17.20% of  GDP, while non-tax havens have an average FDI 
inflow of  only 3.01%. Those numbers are virtually unchanged for small states, as tax havens 
with populations of  4 million or fewer have an average FDI net inflow of  17.75% of  GDP, 
while non-tax havens of  the same size have an average FDI net inflow of  3.92% of  GDP. 
The results are similar for the lower population levels of  1.5 million or fewer and 1 million 
or fewer, although the probability that these results due to chance (6.3% and 8.1%, 
respectively) are too high to make conclusions with any certainty. The results for all 
jurisdictions and jurisdictions with populations of  4 million and fewer, however, are robust 
enough to conclude that tax havens do depend on FDI inflows to a greater extent than non-
tax havens, as befits jurisdictions that have decided to base their economic health on 
attracting customers from foreign countries.  
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Table 2.7: Average FDI as Percentage of  GDP, by population 
All jurisidictions (n=197) 
 Average %  t-score Pr (random) 
Tax Haven (n=35) 17.20 (8.31) -3.67 0.0002 
Non-Tax Havens (n=162) 3.01 (0.25)   
    
4 million people or fewer (n=85) 
Tax Haven (n=32) 17.75 (9.07) -1.96 0.027 
Non-Tax Havens (n=53) 3.92 (0.54)   
    
1.5 million people or fewer (n=55) 
Tax Haven (n=25) 20.38 (11.59) -1.55 0.063 
Non-Tax Havens 
(n=30) 3.90 (0.88)   
    
1 million people or fewer (n=48) 
Tax Haven (n=24) 21.17 (12.05) -1.42 0.081 
Non-Tax Havens 
(n=24) 3.93 (1.07)   
Data Source: World Bank. Insignificant results in italics. 
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Regression Analysis12 
As Table 2.8 demonstrates, there is support for H4, but not H3. High FDI inflow is 
the mark of  a healthy national economy, not just tax haven status, and when tax havens are 
compared with states like China, the UK, or the US, the relationship between tax haven 
status and FDI evaporates. It is, however, significant in tax havens with small populations, 
which is logically consistent with the argument, as small states are less likely to have the 
resources to be economically competitive, and are therefore more likely to consider 
becoming tax havens. Between these results and the R2 values increasing as the population 
numbers drop, suggesting that this relationship grows stronger the smaller the population, 
jurisdictions that are tax havens and democratic – which strongly correlates to high 
governance levels13 - are more likely to have higher FDI inflows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 The absence of significant variation in the bivariate analyses among the different small population 
levels led me to eliminate the 1.5 million and 1 million population cut-points from the regression analyses. 
13 Polity IV scores and World Governance Index scores have a correlation coefficient of .68. 
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Table 2.8 Logistic Regression of  Tax Havens by FDI Inflows population   
 
All States     4 million      
Foreign Direct 
Investment -0.0001    0.002* 
 
World Bank 
Region 0.074    -0.009    
 
Island 0.871    1.464    
 
GDP per capita 
PPP 0.037* -0.034 
 
Polity IV  0.073 0.027 
 
Constant -3.558***    -2.719**    
 
N 161    52    
 
Chi2 9.27    16.34    
 
Pseudo R2  0.103    0.304    
 
Legend * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Low or Zero Taxes 
Tax havens become tax havens by using what sovereignty they have to lower taxes 
and more easily allow private individuals to create corporations for an additional layer of  
secrecy. The strategy is that by lowering taxes, increasing secrecy, and easing incorporation, 
the customers they attract will make up whatever domestic revenue shortfall there is in 
processing and registration fees, as well as customs and import duties and subsidies from 
larger states for domestic public goods like security, and finally building “ring fences” with 
the municipal tax codes that force residents to pay higher taxes than non-residents (Palan, 
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010). As a result, the expectation is that average corporate income 
tax rates in tax havens are lower than in non-tax havens. 
Bivariate Analysis 
The results demonstrated in Table 2.9 meet these expectations. Given that KPMG 
reports that eight tax havens have 0% corporate income tax rates – and 13 more do not 
publicize their tax structure at all – the findings that tax haven corporate income tax rates are 
8-9% lower on average than non-tax havens is not surprising (KPMG, 2017). Reflecting a 
global downward trend in corporate income tax rates, non-tax havens average 25.90%, while 
tax havens average 17.23%. As the jurisdiction populations get smaller, tax haven income tax 
rates drop, as small state theory suggests they would: 16.92% at 4 million or fewer, 16.10% at 
1.5 million or fewer, and 16.03% at 1 million or fewer. The same trend does not hold for 
non-tax havens, primarily because some resource-dependent jurisdictions – which tend to be 
smaller - use their corporate tax rates for rent seeking: Suriname, for example, has a tax rate 
of  36% despite having a population of  just over a half  million. As a result, the average tax 
rate for non-tax havens at 4 million or fewer is lower – 23.87% - than it is for non-tax havens 
at 1.5 million and 1 million – 26.32% and 26.13%, respectively. Tax havens and non-tax 
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havens respond to the diminshed responsibility of  serving a small population in opposite 
ways: tax havens impose even lower corporate tax rates and non-tax havens impose higher 
rates, suggesting that tax havens take advantage of  the reduced burden a small population 
represents to lower taxes to attract business, while non-tax havens raise taxes to take 
advantage of  the business already there.  
Table 2.9: Average Corporate Income Tax Rate, by population 
All jurisidictions (n=170) 
 Average %  t-score Pr (random) 
Tax Haven (n=38) 17.23 (1.98) 5.41 0.0001 
Non-Tax Havens (n=132) 25.90 (0.65)   
    
4 million people or fewer (n=69) 
Tax Haven (n=35) 16.92 (2.14) 2.57 0.006 
Non-Tax Havens (n=34) 23.87 (1.64)   
    
1.5 million people or fewer (n=46) 
Tax Haven (n=29) 16.10 (2.51) 2.90 0.003 
Non-Tax Havens (n=17) 26.32 (1.67)   
    
1 million or fewer people (n=40) 
Tax Haven (n=28) 16.03 (2.60) 2.37 0.012 
Non-Tax Havens (n=12) 26.13 (2.26)   
Data Source: KPMG Global Tax Rates 
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Affluence 
Jurisdictions undertake the economic development strategy of  becoming a tax haven 
because it can increase a state’s wealth without costing as much in the way of  infrastructure 
as other strategies like industry or resource extraction. In addition, tax havens are mainly 
states with small populations, meaning that a successful economic development strategy can 
increase personal and collective wealth with relative speed and ease (Hampton, 1996; 
Hampton & Christensen, 2002). Considering that the decision a jurisdiction makes to 
become a tax haven is not without costs or risks, it stands to reason that jurisdictions that 
continue tax haven activities in the face of  public disapprobation must be doing so because 
the financial rewards are significant enough to offset the costs. As a result, the expectation is 
that tax havens would be more affluent than non-tax havens. This dissertation follows 
common practice and uses GDP per capita to measure affluence, with tax havens expected 
to have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens.  
If  tax havens are better governed, then it would stand to reason - given that one of  
the pillars of  good governance according to Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011), among 
others, is having a responsive and representative government – that the decision to become a 
tax haven is not solely one made with the approval of  elites. Indeed, pace Bueno de 
Mesquita et al.  (2004), well-governed states have larger selectorates and winning coalitions, 
meaning that a larger group of  a jurisdiction’s citizens have to – at the very least – approve 
of  the decisions made by the government leading to tax haven status. Therefore, given that 
the decision to become a tax haven is an economic development one, i.e. a decision designed 
to improve the general economic welfare of  the jurisdiction, it stands to reason that the tax 
haven’s popular support is the result of  the jurisdiction’s citizens sharing in the economic 
benefits of  the decision. The expectation then becomes that citizens in tax havens will be 
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better off  than citizens in non-tax havens as result of  the decisions the government has 
made to become a tax haven and the economic impact these decisions have had. Higher 
governance levels implies more governmental stability, which itself  implies popular support 
for existing governmental policies, so if  tax havens have higher governance indicators, then 
the citizens of  the tax havens must support those government policies. And if  citizens of  
the tax havens support those policies, it must be because they are made better off  
economically as a result of  their implementation, leading to the following two hypotheses:  
H5: Tax havens will have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens, regardless of  population. 
H6: Tax havens with small populations will have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens 
with small populations.  
Bivariate Analysis 
As Table 2.10 demonstrates, tax havens do have higher GDPs per capita than non-
tax havens, although the results are not as robust as the others in this chapter. For all 
jurisdictions, however, tax havens do have a higher average GDP per capita at $20,118 than 
non-tax havens at $12,270. This relationship holds for small states, but the distance between 
tax havens and non-tax havens narrows - $19,088 versus $14,427 at 4 million or fewer, 
$20,173 versus $14,880 at 1.5 million or fewer, and $20,542 versus $15,722 at 1 million or 
fewer - and the results are likely enough to be the result of  a random outcome that it is not 
possible to say what that relationship is with any degree of  certainty. The result for all 
jurisdictions, however, is a reliable one, and reinforces the conclusion that tax havens are, in 
general, more affluent than non-tax havens. 
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Table 2.10: Average GDP Per Capita, by populatiom  
All jurisidictions (n=194) 
 
Average  t-score Pr (random) 
Tax Haven (n=35) $20,118.48 ($2,994.90) -2.61 0.005 
Non-Tax Havens (n=159) $12,270.38 ($1,248.94)   
    
4 million people or fewer (n=84) 
Tax Haven (n=32) $19,088.13 ($3,160.51) -1.01 0.157 
Non-Tax Havens (n=52) $14,427.71 ($3,050.06)   
    
1.5 million people or fewer (n=53) 
Tax Haven (n=25) $20,173.02 ($3,675.90) -0.89 0.188 
Non-Tax Havens (n=28) $14,880.97 ($4,538.59)   
    
1 million people or fewer (n=46) 
Tax Haven (n=24) $20,542.11 ($3,813.03) -0.71 0.241 
Non-Tax Havens (n=22) $15,722.99 ($5,743.50)   
Data Source: World Bank. Insignificant results in italics. 
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Regression Analysis 
As Table 2.11 demonstrates, there is some support for hypothesis 5, although not for 
hypothesis 6, and as much as there is for hypotheses 1-4. Tax havens do have higher GDP 
per capita – the generally accepted measure of  broadly distributed economic wealth in both 
the political science and economics literatures – than non-tax havens, suggesting that 
popular support for governments of  tax havens is rooted in the economic benefits received 
from tax haven policies. The Pseudo R2 is low for this regression, however, suggesting that 
this relationship is not very strong. Again, though, it is less possible to draw conclusions 
about the relationship between wealth and tax haven status with confidence as it is to draw 
them about the relationships between governance and FDI inflows and tax haven status.   
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Table 2.11 Logistic Regression of  Tax Havens by GDP Per Capita and population 
 
All States   4 million  
GDP Per 
Capita 0.031* 0.024  
Island 0.907   0.846  
UN 
Membership (omitted)  (omitted)  
World Bank 
Region 0.061  -0.035  
Polity IV  0.051   0.079 
Constant -3.506*** -1.998*  
N      160         52  
Chi2     8.05        4.89  
Pseudo R2      0.089        0.091  
Legend      * p<0.05;    ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  (two-tailed tests) 
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Non-Resource Dependence 
If  jurisdictions make the decision to become tax havens in part because they do not 
have reserves of  natural resources like oil, natural gas, diamonds, or copper or other 
minerals, then they create the virtual resources of  low taxes and strict secrecy to become 
economically stable. Comparing the list of  resource-dependent jurisdictions compiled by the 
World Bank with the list of  tax havens gathered from multiple sources, only two jurisdictions 
appear on both lists: Bahrain and Malaysia (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, & 
Richmond, 2012).14  This result conforms with the argument of  the dissertation: becoming a 
tax haven is an economic development strategy, and jurisdictions that have natural resources 
have no need to become tax havens, while jurisdictions that become tax havens do so 
because they do not have natural resources to exploit.  
The economic profile of  a tax haven is that of  a relatively affluent jurisdiction whose 
wealth is almost entirely dependent on external sources. This wealth is attracted to the tax 
haven through the explicit strategy of  lowering taxes, a strategy the jurisdiction resorts to in 
lieu of  any other promising options for revenue generation.  
Geographic and Demographic Characteristics 
Small Populations 
As Table 2.12 demonstrates, tax havens have small populations. Of  the 51 tax 
havens, 40 have populations of  1 million people or fewer. By extension, therefore, not only 
do most tax havens have small populations, but most small jurisidictions are tax havens: 
there are 71 jurisdictions with 1 million people or fewer, meaning that 56% of  them are tax 
havens. This proportion does not change very much if  the British Commonwealth 
Secretariat’s definition of  “small” – 1.5 million – used. The number of  tax havens now rises 
14 See the appendix for both lists.  
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to 41, out of  a total of  77, meaning that 53% of  all jurisdictions with populations of  1.5 
million or fewer are tax havens. The most liberal definition of  “small” in a global context is 4 
million or fewer; using this criterion, all but three tax havens are included as a small state. 
This total of  48 tax havens out of  108 total states with this population criterion translates to 
44% of  states with populations of  4 million or fewer. Generally speaking, one of  every two 
small states is a tax haven. To an extent, when the literature (Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, 
& Read, 1998; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Vlcek, 2008) discusses the political economy 
of  the small state, it’s discussing tax havens. 
Table 2.12: Tax Havens vs Non-Tax Havens as Small States  
 
4 million or 
fewer 
 1.5 million 
or fewer 
 1 million or 
fewer 
 
Tax Haven 48 
Chi2 = 
55.73 41 
Chi2 = 
61.99 40 
Chi2 = 
68.42 
Non-Tax 
Haven 60 
Pr = 
0.0001 36 
Pr = 
0.0001 30 Pr = 0.0001 
Total 108  77  70  
 
Small states deciding to become tax havens is also a function of  the characteristics of  
small state economies and demographics. Small states are relatively easy for a small group of  
commercial and financial elites – such as the Bay Street Boys – to dominate for their own 
advantage. Part of  this dominance is the result of  the state’s size and population, but also is 
the result of  secondary effects like a relative absence of  an independent media, or of  higher 
education, meaning that the probability of  an organized opposition to a movement towards 
becoming a tax haven is low. This absence of  opposition is reinforced by cultural factors: 
small states tend to have cohesive, tight-knit cultures with strong social networks that make 
decision-making easier but discourage whistle-blowing and strenuous debate. And while 
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small states translate to a general inability to engage in large-scale enterprises in order to 
compete economically, they also have relatively low tax burdens and infrastructure costs, 
especially if  those costs are being partially offset by a former colonizing state, meaning that 
their small population size is both a strength and a weakness. Small size is also, ultimately, a 
determining factor in which economic path a state takes (Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, & 
Read, 1998; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Vlcek, 
2008). 
Islands 
As Table 2.13 demonstrates, two-thirds of  the 51 tax havens – 34 - are islands. Of  
224 states in the World Bank’s database, 72 of  them are islands, meaning that nearly half  
(47%) the world’s islands are tax havens. The role islands play in the tax haven economy is 
significant enough that it has generated its own subfield in political geography (Cobb, 1998; 
Cobb, 2001; Hampton, 1996; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Vlcek, 2009). Islands that 
become tax havens are usually small, but close to major capital exporters like Rotterdam, 
New York, or Tokyo, as sharing a time zone and being a relatively short plane ride away was 
more important in the pre-Internet era when most jurisdictions made the decions that led 
them to become tax havens. Small islands that become tax havens also tend to be densely 
populated, which prohibits the dependence on land-based revenue-generators like agriculture 
that require protectionist economic policy to thrive, and instead creates a relatively small elite 
merchant class that benefit economically from international free trade and can switch 
relatively easily to financial service provision (Cobb, 2001; Hampton, 1996; Vlcek, 2008).  
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Table 2.13: Comparison of  Tax Havens and Islands 
 
Non-Tax haven Tax Haven Total  
Not island 135 17 152 
 
Island 38 34 72 
 
Total 173 51 224 
chi2 = 36.09 
Pr = 0.0001 
 
 
Tax havens are small, wealthy, politically and economically stable, outwardly focused 
jurisdictions that tend to avoid conflict and create a political environment that, while not 
strongly democratic, at least allows for contestation, free speech, and a relative absence of  
corruption which, given the potential for corruption, is all the more remarkable. In fact, tax 
havens are the sort of  model of  small state developing world success stories that 
organizations like the World Bank strive to create. Instead, because of  the strategy tax 
havens pursue to achieve that stability, international campaigns are mounted against them by 
states that have long since achieved the wealth and stability the tax havens seek.  
International Anti-Tax Haven Campaigns 
What do these campaigns involve, and how much of  a deterrent to the tax havens do 
these campaigns represent? The most significant campaign against tax havens was 
undertaken by the OECD starting in 1998. The OECD targeted jurisdictions engaging in 
what it called “harmful tax competition” (OECD, 1998). The criteria for judging whether a 
jurisdiction was practicing harmful tax competition were: 1) poor or nonexistent information 
exchange; 2) complete opacity; 3) either no significant economic activities or ring fencing of  
foreign corporations; and 4) zero or very low taxes (Hishikawa, 2002; OECD, 1998). The 
OECD published a report called “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” in 
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April 1998 and followed it with the formation of  the Forum on Harmful Tax Competition, a 
group charged with identifying which jurisdictions were practicing harmful tax competition, 
and which were just preferential tax regimes (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hishikawa, 2002; 
OECD, 1998). 
According to the Forum, a preferential tax regime is one in which: income taxes are 
either nonexistent or very low; the tax regime applies only to non-residents (“ring fencing”); 
and there is an intentional lack of  access to information about the level of  taxation and who 
benefits from it. Harmful or abusive tax havens, by contrast, are jurisdictions that have all the 
characteristics of  a preferential tax regime, but also publicly advertise themselves as a place 
where nonresidents can evade taxes in their home countries. In addition, harmful tax havens 
will refuse to cooperate with other jurisdictions in sharing information, as well as the 
aforementioned general lack of  transparency. Finally, harmful tax havens have no substantial 
activity requirment, meaning that firms do not have to undertake a certain amount of  
activity in residence at the haven in order to qualify for the regime. According to the OECD, 
harmful tax competition has the following effects: altering the location of  financial and other 
services; erosion of  tax base of  other jurisdictions; distortion of  trade and investment 
patterns; diminishment of  global welfare; and erosion of  the fairness of  the tax system, as 
well as the resulting erosion of  taxpayer confidence in the integrity of  the system (Eden & 
Kudrle, 2005; Hishikawa, 2002; OECD, 1998).  
The OECD decided to counteract what they concluded to be harmful tax practices 
by initiating a naming and shaming campaign, and released a list of  41 jurisdictions they 
designated “uncooperative tax havens” in June, 2000. “Uncooperative” in this case meant the 
OECD had concluded the jurisdiction had the characteristics of  a harmful tax haven, they 
requested the jurisdiction sign a Memorandum of  Understanding (MOU) saying they would 
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reform their tax regimes by July 31, 2001, and the jurisdiction had refused. The OECD had 
initally identified 47 jurisdictions, but Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, 
Mauritius, and San Marino were able to keep their names off  the list by agreeing to reform. 
The impact was immediate: by August, 2001, 35 of  the 41 jurisdictions on the list had signed 
the MOU, and four jurisdictions – Tonga, Seychelles, Curacao (then part of  the now-
dissolved Netherlands Antilles), and the Isle of  Man – had repealed banking legislation.  
The pressure on tax havens to reform in 2000 did not just come from the OECD. 
The Financial Action Task Force, an international organization affiliated with the OECD 
that focuses on anti-money laundering initiatives, released its own list of  15 non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, also in June. In addition, the Financial Stability Forum, a group of  finance 
ministers and central bankers established the G-7 to study and promote methods for 
increasing financial stability, divided a list of  37 tax havens into three categories depending 
on how well the jurisdictions monitored financial activity – highest quality, average, and 
worse than average – and released the list to the public in 2000. Combined with reports by 
other international organizations like the European Union’s follow-up investigation to their 
1996 “Verona Paper” on preferential tax regimes and tax harmonization in 1999, the Basel 
Committee and their insurance arm the Offshore Group of  Supervisors, 2000 represented 
the high water mark for internationally-coordinated anti-tax haven campaigns (Eden & 
Kudrle, 2005; OECD, 1998).  
These organizations did achieve a certain measure of  symbolic success with the 
campaigns. There was opposition to the effort, as Caribbean countries followed Barbados’s 
lead and formed the International Tax Investment Organization (ITIO). The group’s 
argument was that the OECD and the other IOs were being unfair, that the tax havens had 
not been consulted when the policies to which they were being asked to adhere were 
94
designed. The ITIO further argued that the IOs were targeting only jurisdictions that were 
not members of  their organizations and ignoring the tax havens like Switzerland or 
Luxembourg in their midst. Finally, the ITIO argued that the short timetable – one year – 
demonstrated that the IOs were more interested in gaining compliance from the tax havens 
rather than in actual reform. The ITIO was joined in their opposition by American right 
wing think tanks like the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, whose influence doubtless 
contributed to the US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s May 2001 public statement 
criticizing the OECD’s effort as “too broad” (US Treasury, 2001), signalling that US support 
for the anti-tax haven effort going forward would be limited. Despite this opposition, the 
OECD persisted, and managed by 2004 to gain MOU signatures from every jurisdiction on 
the original blacklist except Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, and the Marshall 
Islands. The success of  the anti-tax haven effort has been that it has protected tax 
harmonization as a norm – indeed, as Table 2.7 demonstrates, global corporate income tax 
rates are harmonizing to around 25%. The question then becomes, were their targets 
materially harmed by the campaign? 
If  jurisdictions do make the rational calculation to become tax havens, as this 
dissertation suggests, then part of  that calculation has to include whether they will be 
punished and suffer as a result of  acting, if  not outside international law, then as a renegade 
state that assists individuals and firms from other states in evading being held to the laws in 
their homelands (Eden & Kudrle, 2005). The primary punishment dealt by the international 
community of  nations against tax havens was the naming and shaming campaigns of  2000 
carried out by the OECD, the FATF, and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), among others, 
in which tax havens were threatened with being put on a blacklist if  they did not at least sign 
agreements stating their intention to comply with international tax harmonization standards 
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and change their tax laws. The OECD web site, as of  2017, bragged that every jurisdiction 
they targeted as a tax haven either changed their laws or signed an agreement expressing 
their intention to do so, implying that the campaign they began in 2000 has been a complete 
success in terms of  getting recalcitrant jurisdictions to comply (OECD, 2017). By that 
metric, the naming and shaming effort was undoubtedly a success, as it was a success in that 
these organizations did protect the norms of  international cooperation and tax 
harmonization; corporate tax rates have been falling since the beginning of  the campaign, 
and more jurisdictions than not currently have a corporate income tax rate of  25% (KPMG, 
2017). The important question, however, is to what extent did the naming and shaming 
campaign deter tax haven behavior? If  the campaign was truly successful, tax havens would 
have experienced a decrease in FDI after 2000, as potential customers found somewhere 
more reputable to invest as a result of  being warned off  by the international community. In 
addition, more jurisdictions would make the decision to stop pursuing tax haven policies in 
the face of  this severe punishment, also causing FDI to decrease. Given the preponderance 
of  results presented in this dissertation, however, it does not seem likely that tax havens 
responded to the campaign in this way, generating the following final two hypotheses:  
H7: Tax havens will not have lower levels of  FDI inflows after the 2000 naming and shaming 
campaign than they did before the campaign, regardless of  population. 
H8: Tax havens with small populations will not have lower levels of  FDI inflows after the 2000 
naming and shaming campaign than they did before the campaign. 
Bivariate Analysis 
As Table 2.14 demonstrates, tax havens actually performed much better on average 
in the 15 years following the naming and shaming campaign compared to the 30 years 
preceding it – the 30 years referred to as the “golden age” of  tax havens in Palan, Murphy, & 
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Chavagneux (2010) and Shaxson (2012), among others. It is possible that the naming and 
shaming effort had a backfire effect, helping to publicize the tax havens to a wider audience, 
thereby increasing FDI inflows. For all tax havens, FDI inflows increased from a pre-
campaign average of  $1.6 billion to a post-campaign average of  over $6 billion. This result 
holds for the tax havens with smaller populations, as well: a pre-campaign average of  $605 
million compared to a post-campaign average of  nearly $4.3 billion for tax havens with 
populations of  4 million or fewer; a pre-campaign average of  $383 million compared to a 
post-campaign average of  $3.1 billion for tax havens with populations of  1.5 million or 
fewer; and a pre-campaign average of  $398 million compared to a post-campaign average of  
$3.2 billion for tax havens with populations of  1 million or fewer. Whatever the exact reason 
– or combination of  reasons – for the comparative increase in FDI inflows in tax havens 
following the naming and shaming campaigns of  2000, it is clear that the decision made by 
jurisdictions to become tax havens is a rational one; the reward is definitely greater than the 
risk, especially when the risk turns out to be minimal.  
Table 2.14: Comparison of  Average Tax Haven FDI, 1970-2000 vs. 2001-2016 
 
Mean 1970-2000 FDI Mean 2001-2016 FDI  
All Tax Havens  $1,640,547,759.16 $6,007,172,848.08 
t-value = -1.74 
Pr = 0.0426 
Tax Havens 4 
million or fewer $605,163,312.08 $4,293,155,502.67 
t-value = -2.24 
Pr = 0.0143 
Tax Havens 1.5 
million or fewer $383,556,756.55 $3,128,143,469.56 
t-value = -1.70 
Pr = 0.0473 
Tax Havens 1 
million or fewer $398,031,397.16 $3,235,959,035.37 
t-value = -1.70 
Pr = 0.0479 
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Regression Analysis 
As Table 2.15 demonstrates, there is statistical support for both hypotheses, although 
the support for hypotheses 7 and 8 is more of  the “dog that didn’t bark” variety in that the 
effect of  tax havens on the difference in FDI post-campaign compared to pre-campaign is 
insignificant. If  the result was negative and significant, then there would be no support for 
the hypotheses. The fact that this is not the case, combined with the relatively low R2 for 
these regressions, suggests that however FDI difference behaved for all jurisdictions 
regardless of  population level, it likely had nothing to do with the anti-tax haven campaign.  
It is also possible that any negative impact the campaign had was washed away in the 
general upward surge of  FDI into the global financial system of  the 21st century, as 
technological developments in communication and travel made tax havens even more 
accessible and attractive to potential customers. That this relationship becomes stronger as 
the populations get smaller – as indicated by the increasing R2 values - is consistent with the 
other results generated by the other regressions in this dissertation, as well as the positive 
impact both democracy and existing wealth have on FDI.  
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Table 2.15 
Regression of  Tax Havens by Difference in FDI 1970-2000 vs. 2001-2016 
and population 
 
      All    4 million  
FDI Difference -0.0001    0.0009 
 
Island 1.082    1.098  
 
World Bank 
Region 
0.080    -0.079 
 
Polity IV  0.059 0.050 
 
GDP per capita 
PPP 
0.031* -0.044 
 
Constant -3.460***    -1.79*  
 
N      155            49  
 
Chi2      7.24         9.90  
 
Pseudo R2       0.086         0.200  
 
Legend      * p<0.05;    ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)  
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Summary of  Findings  
Hypotheses Concerning Governance 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern the relationship between tax haven status and 
governance quality. A test of  this relationship found it positive, regardless of  population 
level. Tax havens are better governed than non-tax havens, a finding consistent with the 
argument that the process of  becoming a tax haven is the result of  an economic 
development strategy implemented by a rational acting jurisdiction. 
Hypotheses Concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the relationship between tax haven status and FDI 
inflows. A test of  this relationship found it positive, but only for tax havens with small 
populations. Small tax havens – those with populations of, at most, 4 million – attract more 
FDI inflow than non-tax havens of  the same size, a finding consistent with the reality that, 
at large populations tax havens are competing against the largest, healthies economies in the 
world, and the argument that becoming a tax haven means a jurisdiction makes its economy 
dependent on capital inflows to flourish as part of  its economic development strategy.  
Hypotheses Concerning Citizen Prosperity  
Hypotheses 5 and 6 concern the relationship between tax haven status and citizen 
prosperity, i.e. are citizens of  tax havens better off  economically than citizens of  non-tax 
havens. A test of  this relationship using Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Personal 
Purchasing Power) as a measure found it positive and robust, but only for tax havens as a 
whole and for tax havens with populations of  1.5 million people or fewer. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that, unlike resource-dependent states of  similar size, tax 
havens are relatively prosperous and that prosperity is relatively evenly distributed amongst 
their citizens.  
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Hypotheses Concerning International Anti-Tax Haven Campaigns  
Hypotheses 7 and 8 concern the relationship between tax haven FDI inflow rates 
and the 2000 international naming and shaming anti-tax haven campaign undertaken by the 
OECD, among others. If  the campaign had been successful, FDI inflows from 2001 to 2016 
should be lower than those from 1970-2000, a result of  potential customers being dissuaded 
from using tax havens and from the tax havens themselves changing the laws and procedures 
that defined them as tax havens. A test of  this relationship revealed that, for tax havens with 
small populations, the reverse is true: FDI inflows actually increased, a finding especially true 
for tax havens with populations of  1 million people or fewer – which is to say, most of  
them. This finding is consistent with the argument that, in undertaking the strategy to 
become tax havens, jurisdictions rationally weighed the benefits of  becoming tax havens 
against the potential cost of  becoming a renegade state in the eyes of  the international 
community, and found the benefits to outweigh the costs. 
General Summary of  Findings 
The results of  the regression analyses of  this chapter are consistent with the 
descriptive statistics and the first-cut analyses of  chapters one and two. Tax havens are more 
likely to have higher governance indicators at all population levels, suggesting that they are, 
as a class of  jurisdictions, well-governed compared to non-tax havens. In tax havens with 
small populations – regardless of  definition of  “small” used – this high governance is related 
to higher levels of  foreign direct investment (FDI), both before and after the 2000 anti-tax 
haven naming and shaming campaign. In fact, in tax havens with small populations, FDI 
actually increased in the wake of  the naming and shaming campaign. A final characteristic of  
tax havens is a higher level of  GDP per capita, meaning citizens of  tax havens might be 
wealthier than citizens of  non-tax havens. One potential criticism of  the use of  GDP per 
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capita is that it favors small states with large incomes, a criticism that might be valid 
considering how many tax havens fit this profile. The results, however, demonstrate that this 
finding is as true for a large tax haven like Hong Kong as it is for a small one like San 
Marino. Tax havens are stable, wealthy, and adept at attracting FDI regardless of  
international attempts to prevent them from doing so.  
 
  
102
Chapter Three 
Back to the Islands 
Cuba, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands took three different 
development paths since their decisions of  the mid-1960s. The Bahamas and the Caymans 
remained tax havens and, as Table 3.1 demonstrates, reaped the benefits. Both relatively well-
governed, with Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) averages of  1.02 and 1.12, 
respectively, the Bahamas and the Caymans prospered, the Bahamas with an average annual 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow of  nearly $200 million and an average annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita of  $20,273. The Caymans in particular became an 
economic powerhouse, with an average annual FDI inflow of  over $5.3 billion and an 
average annual GDP per capita of  nearly $50,000, one of  the world’s highest.  
Table 3.1: Comparison of  Main Indicators for Bahamas, Cuba, Cayman Islands, and Jamaica 
 
Governance FDI GDP/Capita 
Bahamas 1.02 $199,316,141.93 $20,273.34 
Cuba -0.65 N/A N/A 
Cayman Islands 1.12 $5,350,661,261.90 $49,903.03 
Jamaica 0.09 $305,235,869.13 $7,005.87 
 
Jamaica and Cuba did not fare as well. Turning away from becoming tax havens, 
perhaps as a result of  poor governmental decision-making as indicated by their relatively low 
WGI averages of  -0.65 and 0.09, respectively, Cuba and Jamaica used different strategies. 
Run by a totalitarian regime with an anti-capitalist philosophy since the beginning of  the 
time period studied and as a Soviet satellite state until 1989, Cuba took what could be called 
a path diametrically opposed to the one taken by the tax havens. As such, there is no 
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financial data available, but given that the WGI average correlates to FDI =.34 and to GDP 
per capita =.63, saying that Cuba did not prosper economically under this system seems like 
a relatively safe conclusion to draw. Jamaica, on the other hand, has managed small but 
steady economic growth of  around 1% annually, leveraging its location and climate into a 
thriving tourism industry and attracting an average annual FDI of  over $305 million, or 
more than $100 million per year more than the Bahamas. Jamaica, however, has to divide its 
GDP over nearly 3 million people, compared to the Bahamas’ 100,000, resulting in an 
average annual GDP per capita of  nearly one-third as much, or just over $7,000. When 
viewed through the dispassionate lenses of  geography and political economy, these islands 
seem to have relatively similar characteristics. All connected to colonial or geopolitical 
patrons to varying degrees, no natural resources around which to build an economy, 
relatively small tropical islands with relatively insular populations, but they took three 
different strategic paths, and the results of  taking those paths illustrate the argument made in 
this dissertation: tax havens leverage stable governance into prosperity through an explicit 
economic development strategy because this strategy is the best of  a limited set of  options 
available to them.  
Implications of  Findings and Conclusion 
Jurisdictions become tax havens because it is the rational action for them to take. 
These jurisdictions – some of  which have so little sovereignty that they cannot be classified 
as “states” but are closer to Krasner’s (1999) definition of  a “quasi-state” - have no other 
reasonable options for an economic development strategy. They have little to no natural 
resources, and not enough land or people to profitably attempt large-scale agriculture or 
industrial projects. What they do have, however, is enough of  a post-colonial lifeline to their 
former masters to count on them for security and some domestic funding. They have strong 
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enough political and governmental institutions to make well-reasoned politically popular 
decisions regarding their polity and the ability to competently implement those decisions. 
They are culturally unified and tight-knit in a way that ensures that the one product they will 
provide to the world – secrecy – will be well-protected and nearly absolute. These cultural 
characteristics will probably also act as a counter-weight against dictatorship, corruption, and 
unrest – the qualities that tend to scare off  potential customers.  
Because these customers will come from outside their borders, as they always have. 
Most tax havens were formerly trading centers, with a mercantile elite population that 
naturally looked outward rather than inward for the sources of  its wealth. The Bay Street 
Boys were not landed aristocracy: they were lawyers and bankers, natural allies to the new 
class of  island-hopping offshore experts guiding the jurisdictions toward their new status as 
tax havens. These experts were only guiding, however, not controlling; the data and results 
presented in this dissertation support the argument that becoming a tax haven is a conscious, 
intentional strategy. The jurisdictions are presented with a group of  constrained choices for 
competing economically; these constraints include the internal lack of  resources discussed 
above, as well as the external constraint of  international disapprobation awaiting them if  
they decided to become tax havens. As it turns out, this external constraint is no match for 
the economic forces pushing these jurisdictions to become tax havens. This disapprobation 
does not come with an actual price tag; the United Nations (UN) has never attempted to levy 
sanctions against a tax haven. Indeed, levying such sanctions would be nearly impossible, 
given that 34 of  its members are themselves tax havens, which illustrates one reason why 
international anti-tax haven efforts are so lackluster – the organizations that undertake them 
either have tax havens as their members in good standing, or have members whose colonies 
or dependencies are tax havens. Even if  the member countries of  the organizations are not 
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formally connected to tax havens, their elites are connected informally as customers. As a 
result, recent anti-tax haven efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have been watered down. 
While naming and shaming campaigns can be effective in moderating state behavior in 
certain circumstances (Dai, 2005), the anti-tax haven campaigns undertaken at the turn of  
the millennium were compromised from the start.  
And these campaigns were the height of  international anti-tax haven activity. The 
results from this dissertation reinforce the general suspicion that these campaigns have 
always been ineffective, not least because tax havens have been an integral part of  the global 
economy since their inception. The rich and powerful have always needed a place to hide 
their money – from the state, from the poor, from each other – and in the “golden age” of  
the 1970s and 1980s, they were joined by a new group of  customers: criminals and, in the 
1990s, terrorists seeking to both hide their profits and gain a foothold in the international 
financial system in order to better operate transnationally. It is this new class of  customer on 
whom I will focus as my research moves forward – namely, the role tax havens played in 
helping organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations transition from national to 
transnational organisms, similar in structure to the multi-national corporations who also use 
the tax havens evade billions of  dollars in corporate income tax. I also intend to focus on 
another class of  customer: dictators, who use tax havens to help them become kleptocrats as 
they hollow out their countries’ economies. My theory is that the end result of  the actions 
taken by these three groups and the tax havens that enable them is instability in the states in 
which they operate.  It is my suspicion that one reason that non-tax havens have lower 
governance scores than tax havens is that these groups avoid operating in tax havens so as 
not to destabilize them, thereby maintaining the stability of  the financial structure on which 
their organizations are based. One general argument made in favor of  anti-tax haven 
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collective action is that their presence destabilizes non-tax havens by depriving them of  tax 
revenue they would have available to them if  tax havens did not exist (Dharmapala, 2008). I 
believe that an additional reason for this destabilization is that tax havens enable violent non-
state actors like terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates to more effectively operate 
in non-tax havens. States are caught in a pincer attack, prey to destabilizing activity from one 
group while being deprived of  the tax revenue they would need to help counter that activity 
and govern effectively by the other. I further believe that the states that are the least well-
governed are that way due to these two factors as well as the predations of  a third: a dictator 
who, by definition, puts his own welfare above that of  the citizens in his charge, neglecting 
their effective governance in favor of  becoming a kleptocrat and stealing as much as possible 
without being ousted. All with the help of  the tax havens who are, after all, being rational 
and seizing the opportunities the global marketplace gives them.  
Limitations of  Findings 
 There are two potential limitations to drawing conclusions from the data and analysis 
in this dissertation: endogeneity; and the inability to rule out other, equally plausible, 
explanations. Or, in other words, it is difficult to determine from the data and results 
presented whether jurisdictions become tax havens because they are well-governed small 
states, or whether jurisdictions become well-governed small states because they are tax 
havens, or whether there is some other force at work driving this relationship. While the data 
and the analysis do provide robust support for the argument this dissertation presents, 
logical imputation is all there is: the lack of  direct observation of  the process each 
jurisdiction has undergone precludes a more concrete conclusion from being reached.  
 Greater certainty would require deeper analysis, possibly in the form of  several case 
studies. The “four islands” sketch is merely intended to illustrate the process of  how 
107
jurisdictions become tax havens with the assistance of  the battery of  outside experts that 
descend on likely jurisdictional candidates. In addition to mapping the political processes 
that led to tax haven creation, extensive analysis of  when the appropriate laws were passed in 
each jurisdiction, as well as determining when each jurisdiction began their marketing 
campaign. If, as this dissertation posits, these jurisdictions are rational actors, then it follows 
logically that elites in each jurisdiction would recognize the necessity of  marketing 
themselves as a tax haven in addition to creating the environment necessary to attract 
customers. It further follows that, if  this were the case, that indicators like FDI inflows and 
GDP per capita would increase following the imposition of  these laws and the instantiation 
of  these campaigns. As this research project evolves, the fruits of  this research will be 
included in future work. 
Possible Solutions 
As the analysis of  this dissertation illustrated, previous attempts to prevent tax 
havens from operating have been ineffective. Indeed, it is possible that the primary attempt – 
the 2000 international anti-tax haven naming and shaming campaign – had the opposite 
effect, increasing FDI flows to tax havens in the years following the campaign. That this 
finding is the opposite of  the one arrived at by Barry et al (2013) suggests that naming and 
shaming campaigns can be effective at deterring foreign investment in some cases – human 
rights abuses – but not in others – tax havens. Part of  the problem may be that the bulk of  
anti-tax haven campaigns take the form of  requiring a certain level of  compliance from tax 
havens. Since these campaigns are hamstrung by elites within the states carrying out the 
campaigns – elites who benefit from the tax havens’ continued operations – it is relatively 
costless for the tax havens to comply. Tax havens can usually comply in the form of  signing 
a memorandum of  understanding promising to change their laws and practices, or by 
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changing reporting laws that effect a certain level of  international cooperation while still 
protecting their core practices that allow them to continue to function. In addition, tax 
havens will cooperate with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in their identification 
and prosecution of  criminals or terrorists using their banks for money laundering and 
financing terror attacks via the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) the FATF operates in each 
tax haven. This cooperation – still relatively limited – as well as shifting the focus to money 
laundering and terrorism financing has the effect of  improving the tax haven’s public image 
while protecting the multi-billion-dollar core business of  tax avoidance and evasion they 
facilitate (FATF, 2017). 
Solutions involving punitive international collective action, like the creation of  
country by country reporting accounting standards requiring multi-national corporations 
(MNCs) to itemize their transactions in each country in which they do business on income 
tax statements and annual reports, or a global financial registry recording exactly who owns 
which stocks and bonds, or making public registries of  beneficial ownership for each 
jurisdiction mandatory upon pain of  trade sanctions, seem unrealistic as options, as the main 
obstacle to these plans is that the economic hegemons of  the world – namely, the US and 
the UK – are not enthusiastic about their implementation (Christensen, 2011, 2012; Murphy, 
2017; Zucman, 2015). This conclusion does not preclude the possibility of  collective action 
against tax havens in general, however. Avi-Yonah (2000) proposes a uniform withholding 
tax on portfolio investment, in which any entity paying interest or dividends would pay the 
tax rather than the individual or firm receiving it. As Avi-Yonah (2000) points out, tax 
havens may be good places for storing money, but high investment returns are gained by 
investing in the US, Japan, or Europe – Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member countries, in other words. States can make up some of  the 
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lost tax revenue in this way when the money repatriates as investment capital. In addition, a 
tax regime similar to this was in place until 1984, so precedent for this sort of  cooperation 
among OECD states does exist (Avi-Yonah, 2000; Dean, 2006-2007). 
Changing tax haven behavior itself, however, must proceed from the assumption that 
tax havens are as much rational actors as any other state. This dissertation has tested this 
assumption and found support for it: given a series of  constraints, tax havens maximize their 
economic well-being by becoming – and continuing to behave as – tax havens. Furthermore, 
given the threat of  international censure via naming and shaming campaigns, tax havens 
again made the calculation to either take symbolic compliance measures but continue 
operating as before, or ignore the campaigns altogether, and emerged better off  than before. 
Given that an international sanctioning campaign with such relatively mild punishments had 
so little deterrent effect on tax haven behavior, expecting the international community to 
band together to administer stiffer penalties seems naïve at best. One possibility would be 
for international enforcement organizations like FATF to partner with OECD and create 
economic incentive packages – tax breaks on consumer products, for example – linked to 
increased cooperation in the exchange of  information on individuals or groups engaged in 
illegal activity. Given a healthy enough incentives package to replace lost income, this 
cooperation could include targeted, specific information exchange on tax evasion (as 
opposed to avoidance). Tax havens, being rational, will agree to cooperate only if  it is in their 
interests to do so, and this cooperation would require determining the amount of  income 
the tax haven would lose by cooperating and replacing it while not endangering their core 
business. It is important to remember when considering approaches to gaining cooperation 
that these strategies must also be palatable to the elites in the states making the offer, as 
those elites are tax haven customers and liable to subvert an unpalatable deal. Therefore, any 
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attempt to gain tax haven cooperation must preserve, to some extent, the tax havens’ ability 
to continue to operate as tax havens.  
Dai (2005) concludes that domestic elites have to buy in to any international 
agreements for them to succeed, and that this process occurs in both states making the 
compliance rules and states being asked to comply with these rules. Any policy 
recommendations concerning tax havens must follow from this conclusion, and from the 
assumption of  rationality stated at the beginning of  this section. Tax havens are weak states 
in the traditional sense, but they are not weak in the sense that they can successfully resist 
any attempts at coercion by traditionally stronger states because of  their utility to elites in 
those self-same stronger states. Selectorates in both tax havens and states attempting to 
enforce anti-tax haven agreements benefit from the failure of  those agreements if  the 
agreements are too punitive, that is, if  they harm the ability of  tax havens to continue to 
provide low tax rates and high levels of  secrecy. This dissertation demonstrates that elites 
have been using tax havens for the bulk of  the 20th and 21st centuries, and these elites, who 
are also members of  the selectorates of  the states attempting to impose anti-tax haven 
regimes, personally benefit from the failure of  those regimes. In addition, the elites that 
make up the selectorates in the tax havens being targeted have staked their livelihoods on the 
success of  the tax havens’ continued operation, and as a result they too personally benefit 
from the failure of  anti-tax haven regimes. The people who would benefit from the success 
of  an anti-tax haven regime – the other 6 billion or so people in the world – are not 
members of  the selectorate in any meaningful way, and therefore have little impact upon the 
regime’s success. 
Therefore, any international collective action attempt to mitigate the deleterious 
impact tax havens have will by necessity need to focus on the carrot rather than the stick. 
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This effort will need to be a collaborative one with the tax havens as willing partners rather 
than targets, meaning that the tax havens will need to benefit from any attempt to curtail 
their activity. The combination of  an economic benefits package that makes importing 
goods cheaper and easier to accomplish – especially to the more remote tax havens like the 
Maldives or the Seychelles – combined with an expansion of  the targeted efforts by the 
FATF and other enforcement organizations to focus on illegal activities – is a possible policy 
solution that will serve to reinforce norms of  good financial conduct, international 
cooperation, information sharing, and transparency while having the possibility of  being 
more than a symbolic success. Tax havens may be weak, but they’re rational, and they have 
strong allies, and any successful anti-tax haven campaign must be mindful of  this reality. 
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Appendix: Jurisdictions by Category and Population Size 
Tax Havens: 
More than Four 
Million (n=3) 
More than 1.5 million, 
fewer than 4 million 
(n=7) 
More than 1 million, 
fewer than 1.5 million 
(n=1) 
Fewer than 1 million 
(n=40) 
 
Data set for 4 million Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 million 
Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 million 
Data set for 1 million  
Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, 
Switzerland 
Costa Rica, Jordan, 
Latvia, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Panama, 
Singapore 
Mauritius Andorra, Anguilla, 
Antigua & Barbuda, 
Aruba, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belize, Bermuda, 
British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Cook 
Islands, Curacao, 
Cyprus, Dominica, 
Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Isle of  
Man, Jersey, 
Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Macao, 
Maldives, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, 
Monaco, Montserrat, 
Nauru, Niue, Samoa, 
San Marino, 
Seychelles, St. Kitts 
& Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Tonga, 
Turks & Caicos, 
Vanuatu, Virgin 
Islands (US) 
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Resource Dependent Jurisdictions: 
More than Four 
Million (n=30) 
More than 1.5 million, 
fewer than 4 million 
(n=6) 
More than 1 million, 
fewer than 1.5 million 
(n=3) 
Fewer than 1 million 
(n=7) 
 
Data set for 4 million Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 million 
Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 million 
Data set for 1 million  
Algeria, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, 
Cameroon, Chad, 
Chile, Dem Rep of  
the Congo, Ecuador, 
Guinea, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Norway, 
Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia 
Congo, Kuwait, 
Mongolia, Oman, 
Turkmenistan, UAE 
Botswana, Gabon, 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Bahrain, Brunei, 
East Timor, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Guyana, Mauritania, 
Qatar, Suriname 
Source: (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012) 
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Neither Tax Havens nor Resource Dependent Jurisdictions: 
More than Four Million 
(n=85) 
More than 1.5 million, 
fewer than 4 million 
(n=18) 
More than 1 million, 
fewer than 1.5 million 
(n=2) 
Fewer than 1 million 
(n=24) 
 
Data set for 4 million Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 
million 
Data set for 4 million 
Data set for 1.5 million 
Data set for 1 million  
Afghanistan, 
Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Belgium, 
Benin, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Canada, 
China, Colombia, 
Croatia, Cuba, 
Czech Rep, 
Denmark, 
Dominican 
Republic,  Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Ivory Coast, Japan, 
Kenya, Korea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Morocco, 
Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Rwanda, Senegal, 
Serbia, Sierra Leone, 
Slovakia, Somalia, 
South Africa, South 
Albania, Armenia, 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Eritrea, Gambia, 
Georgia, Guinea-
Bissau, Jamaica, 
Kosovo, Lesotho, 
Lithuania, 
Macedonia, 
Moldova, Namibia, 
Puerto Rico, 
Slovenia, Togo, 
Uruguay 
Central African 
Republic, Estonia 
American Samoa, 
Bhutan, Cape Verde 
Islands, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Faroe 
Islands, Fed States 
of  Micronesia, Fiji, 
French Polynesia, 
Greenland, Guam, 
Iceland, Kiribati, 
Montenegro, New 
Caledonia, Northern 
Mariana Islands, 
Palau, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sint 
Maarten (Dutch 
Part), Solomon 
Islands, St. Martin 
(French Part), 
Swaziland, Tuvalu 
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Sudan, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, 
Taiwan, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, UK, 
Ukraine, USA, 
Uzbekistan, West 
Bank & Gaza Strip, 
Zimbabwe 
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